Working Paper

On the Basis of (Mis)Trust? Spousal Trust and Trustworthiness in Household Decision Making: Experimental Evidence from India

Working Paper Number 17

Henrike Sternberg

Janina Isabel Steinert

Sebastian Vollmer

WORKING PAPER

Working Paper No. 17

On the Basis of (Mis)Trust? Spousal Trust and Trustworthiness in Household Decision Making: Experimental Evidence from India

Henrike Sternberg
Technical University of Munich

Janina Isabel Steinert
Technical University of Munich

Sebastian Vollmer
University of Goettingen

April 2021

Sternberg, Henrike; Steinert, Janina; Vollmer, Sebastian

Working Paper

On the basis of (mis)trust? Spousal trust and trustworthiness in household decision making: Experimental evidence from India

Discussion Papers, No. 279

Provided in Cooperation with:
Courant Research Centre 'Poverty, Equity and Growth in Developing and Transition Countries', University of Göttingen

Suggested Citation: Sternberg, Henrike; Steinert, Janina; Vollmer, Sebastian (2021) : On the basis of (mis)trust? Spousal trust and trustworthiness in household decision making: Experimental evidence from India, Discussion Papers, No. 279, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Courant Research Centre - Poverty, Equity and Growth (CRC-PEG), Göttingen

This Version is available at:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/233069

Courant Research Centre

'Poverty, Equity and Growth in Developing and Transition Countries: Statistical Methods and Empirical Analysis'

Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
(founded in 1737)

Discussion Papers

No. 279

On the Basis of (Mis)Trust? Spousal Trust and Trustworthiness in Household Decision Making: Experimental Evidence from India

Henrike Sternberg, Janina Isabel Steinert, SebastianVollmer

April 2021

Platz der Göttinger Sieben 5 · 37073 Goettingen · Germany
Phone: +49-(0)551-3921660 · Fax: +49-(0)551-3914059

Email: crc-peg@uni-goettingen.de Web: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/crc-peg

On the Basis of (Mis)Trust? Spousal Trust and Trustworthiness in Household Decision Making: Experimental Evidence from India*

Henrike Sternberg[1], Janina Isabel Steinert[1], and Sebastian Vollmer[2]

[1] *TUM School of Governance, Technical University of Munich, Germany*
[2] *Chair of Development Economics, University of Goettingen, Germany*

This version: April 11, 2021

Abstract: This paper examines the role of spousal trust in intra-household decision making through its potential of inciting the creation of information asymmetries in the presence of resource unobservability. We experimentally elicit spousal trust and trustworthiness by means of a binary trust game to assess heterogeneity in saving behavior among low-income slum dwellers in urban India. 360 married couples were randomly assigned to either a control group, receiving a shared saving device (a lockbox), or a treatment group, receiving a private saving device (a zip-purse) in addition to the lockbox. We find that the supplementary receipt of the private device significantly increased the wife's savings in couples with a low level of spousal trust. In couples with higher levels of trust, the effect coefficient turned negative. While this heterogeneity is driven by the wife's mistrust in absence of her husband's trustworthiness, we provide supportive evidence of an important channel being more effective hiding of the wife's savings amounts, facilitated through the private saving device. From a policy perspective, our findings have important implications for the design and evaluation of household-based (saving) interventions by offering a novel explanation for existing discrepancies between their observed and intended effects.

Keywords: Spousal Trust, Household Decision Making, Saving Interventions, Income Hiding Behavior, Trust Game

JEL codes: D14, D15, D91, J12, O12

*The authors wish to thank Lena Merkel, Regina Dworschak, Holger Rau and Stephan Müller for substantial contributions to data collection and research design. We are grateful to Jonathan Garcia, Marcela Ibañez Diaz and the participants of the seminar on Mind, Society and Development at the University of Göttingen, as well as to the research group of the Chair of International Relations at the Technical University of Munich for their valuable feedback and suggestions at different stages of the research project. The authors want to deeply thank the entire research team in Pune for their support and dedication, including Hrishikesh Patil, Rucha Vasumati Satis, Shewale Aishwarya Balkrishna, Dhanmanjiri Makrand Sathe, Bhagyashree Patole, Chaitali Harshe, Pallavi Sahebrao Suryavanshi, Poonam Pardeshi, Sunil Nanasaheb Nale, Pooja Thombare, Sagar Devidas Mhetre, Devika Ghule, Umesh Ramdas Madane, Anita Dattu Bhalekar, Aditya Mahendra Chandanshive, Mugdha Vijay Narkar, Sarita Goraksh Murtadak, Daingade Vijay Pandurang, Sagar Ramdas Mankar, Dorthi Robin Joseph, Ravindra Dnyandeo Ambore, Aruna Hitendra Kamble, Sunita Zumbar Salunke, Sujata Sanjjay Kale, Sangita Mahesh Kumbhar, Samina Abdul Shaikh. We wish to thank the SNEH Foundation and Shraddha Deo in Pune and Ashwini Kuber for their logistical support.

I Introduction

Most economic and financial decision making models are based on either the unitary household model or cooperative models of decision making. While the former assumes homogenous preferences among household members, the latter continues to assume efficiency in choice outcomes. Empirical evidence suggests that often neither of these assumptions hold.

An extensive literature on income pooling behavior reveals that the relative income distribution within the household affects decision making processes and choice outcomes, however such distribution factors are considered to have no influence in a unitary setting. An early empirical test was conducted by Thomas (1990), who employed survey data on family health and nutrition from Brazil and found that unearned income in the hands of a mother had a larger effect on the family's health than income controlled by the father. In a more recent contribution, Duflo (2003) showed that the impact of pensions received within the scope of the South African social pension program varied by gender of the recipient. Pensions received by women had a large impact on the anthropometric outcomes of girls, while no such effect was found for pensions received by men.

Even though cooperative and bargaining models take such distribution factors into account, they continue to largely assume pareto-efficient outcomes, which presume the absence of alternative solutions that would be preferable for all household members (Browning et al., 2014a). This is contradicted by empirical evidence of failures to realize efficiency gains in the presence of non-cooperative behaviors and information asymmetries between decision makers (e.g. Udry, 1996; Ashraf, 2009; Hoel, 2015; Fiala, 2017; Verschoor et al., 2019).

For instance, Schaner (2015) found in a field experiment in Kenya that wives preferred a private savings account over a joint account when spouses exhibited differences in saving preferences, even if they had to sacrifice interest for this. Moreover, women were more likely to stop using their bank accounts when their husband's access to it is improved (Schaner, 2017). Similarly, Castilla (2019) showed that asymmetric information reduced the pool of resources observed by household members, resulting from the fact that one out of four spouses chose to partly keep their money private when given the option. In her study, this strategic exploitation of information asymmetries led to substantial losses in efficiency that were as high as 24%. This evidence on hiding behaviors among wives suggests that women are willing to endure losses in order to protect information about their income from their husbands or restrict his access to it (e.g. Anderson and Baland, 2002; Baland et al., 2011; Schaner, 2015; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Boltz et al., 2019).

In light of this, a heretofore unexamined underlying factor in theoretical models of household decision making is trust and trustworthiness among spouses. On the one hand, spousal trust and trustworthiness might reflect distribution factors affecting pareto weights or threat points in cooperative or bargaining models, respectively. For instance, in the case of caring preferences, Browning et al. (2014b) suggest that caring for a partner resembles an increase in the partner's pareto weight, giving her a greater weight with respect to egoistic

preferences. Similar considerations might be valid in the case of trust and trustworthiness, whereas one's own trust towards the partner may increase her bargaining power.

On the other hand, when considering the widespread existence of patriarchal societies in which social norms distribute most of the decision power in the husband's favor (Baland and Ziparo, 2017), spousal trust and trustworthiness might assume a different, additional role. As in precisely such societies, divorce or remarriage are rarely an option for women (ibid.), these unbalanced power relations are more likely to result in uncooperative behaviors while remaining *inside* the marriage. In light of this, spousal trust relations could arise as predictors of uncooperative behaviors, such as deliberately withholding information about income, savings or consumption (especially by the weaker positioned household member), and thus, of the creation of information asymmetries.

The neglect of spousal intra-household dynamics as determinants in household decision making may have meaningful consequences from a policy perspective by explaining a discrepancy between observed and intended effects of various household-based interventions. Such factors are often not taken into account when designing (and evaluating) interventions, which are largely based on unitary assumptions and cooperative decision making. This raises the concrete question to what extent the impacts of various household-based interventions, such as loan disbursements, saving interventions or cash transfers, are in fact sensitive to spousal trust and trustworthiness dynamics.

In view of the above, this paper examines whether spousal trust and trustworthiness explain heterogeneity in household financial decision making through their potential of inciting the creation of information asymmetries in the presence of resource unobservability. We test this in the context of a saving promotion intervention that introduces random variation in the hiding behaviors of low-income slum dwellers in urban India, assuming that the intervention's intended effects are particularly sensitive to spousal intra-household dynamics (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Schaner, 2015; Schaner, 2017; Riley, 2018). 360 study households were randomly assigned to either a treatment group receiving a shared saving device (a lockbox with two keys) in combination with a private saving device (a zip-purse), or a control group, receiving only the shared saving device. Spousal trust and trustworthiness were quantified experimentally by a sequential prisoner's dilemma, which was conducted jointly with husbands and wives in a separate lab-in-the-field experiment.

Overall, we find no significant treatment effects of the portable private saving device on participants' total or dis-aggregated saving balances. In contrast, the results reveal statistically significant treatment effects if splitting participants into distinct subgroups according to the dimensions of spousal trust.

The additional receipt of the private saving device substantially increased the wife's savings amounts for couples with a low level of spousal trust, relative to their counterparts with higher levels of spousal trust (p-value: 0.035). Specifically, in the subgroup of couples with an untrustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife, the latter reported saving amounts that were twice as high as those of wives in the subgroup of higher-trust couples. While wives in the low-trust subgroup showed a positive and significant effect of additionally

receiving the private saving device (p-value: 0.06), the effect coefficient turned negative for the subgroups with higher levels of spousal trust.

We provide supportive evidence from within the treatment group that a relevant channel behind the increase in savings in low-trust couples are systematic hiding behaviors of the wife, facilitated through the private saving device. This is additionally supported by the finding that both, the main heterogeneity in treatment effects and the evidence on the hiding channel within the treatment group, are driven by (i) the mutual absence of the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness, (ii) the sample of female participants and (ii) less easily accessible saving balances, precisely bank and post office or national account savings rather than savings at home. In line with this, it seems that low-trust couples use the private saving device as an intermediate means of concealment before resources are secured in participants' bank accounts.

Third, we show that this heterogeneity does not simply reflect differential dimensions of spousal control over financial resources across households. Assuming that spousal trust and trustworthiness and spousal control within the household are likely related, one may argue - in line with previous evidence - that the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects is in fact driven by differential levels of spousal control (Ashraf, 2009; Fiala, 2017; Riley, 2018). However, our results remain unchanged if we include a control variable that captures the wife's involvement in financial decision making in the household and thus, her level of financial control.

This is the first study to examine spousal trust and trustworthiness as factors in household decision making as well as in the specific context of household-based saving interventions. In doing so, we contribute to the line of research that uses experimental games to acquire in-depth insights into decision making processes within the household (Iversen et al., 2011). Moreover, the conducted trust game is only the second and so far the largest experimental elicitation of spousal trust and trustworthiness in a country of the Global South (Castilla, 2015). The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter II introduces the theoretical background of household decision making models and the specific context of household-based saving interventions. Chapter III lays out the experimental design, its testable predictions and empirical strategy, whose results are reported in Chapters IV, V and VI. Chapter VII concludes.

II Theoretical background

A. Models of household decision making and the potential role of spousal trust

Theoretical models of household decision making are roughly classified into unitary and non-unitary models, whereas among the latter the literature further distinguishes between cooperative, bargaining and non-cooperative models (Samuelson, 1956; Becker, 1965; Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Becker, 1981; Carter and Katz, 1997; Fafchamps, 2001). Empirical evidence suggests that unitary models of household

decision making fail to adequately predict economic choice outcomes at the household level, including savings, household demand, child health and labor supply, amongst others (e.g. Thomas, 1990; Browning, 1995; Lundberg et al., 1997; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Attanasio, Lechene, et al., 2002; Duflo, 2003; Attanasio and Lechene, 2014).

By assuming that a single utility function captures the preferences of all household members, such models neither take into account the fact that household members may indeed have very different preferences, nor their bargaining power in the decision making process that is induced by these differences. This is particularly relevant for the household type investigated in this paper, which is at minimum a two-person household, consisting of a married couple, most of the time with children, and often also of further members of the extended family.

The class of collective or cooperative models performs better in this regard by allowing for multiple utility functions to represent differential preferences of household members and by assuming a decision making process between them, which ultimately determines choice outcomes. Important determinants in these models are bargaining or decision making power of household members, and more importantly, their distribution factors (e.g. relative income distribution) and their presumed impact on the decision making process, which itself cannot be observed directly. In the case of bargaining models, distribution factors are defined as affecting the decision making process by determining household members' individual threat points, i.e. their potential outcomes if no agreement is reached (Browning et al., 2014b).

The most prominent example for a distribution factor is relative income, wages or earnings of household members, examined through tests of income pooling, which were used extensively to assess the validity of the unitary model (ibid.). Browning et al. (2014a) provides an overview of some of these studies focused on high-income countries, which provide strong evidence against the validity of the unitary model of household decision making (e.g. Thomas, 1990; Browning, 1995; Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Attanasio, Lechene, et al., 2002; Duflo, 2003). Additional distribution factors that have - however less extensively - been explored by the empirical literature are relative levels of education, control of land, factors related to divorce laws or benefits, reported influence within the household, background family factors or relative networks of husband and wife (see e.g. Browning et al., 2014a, for a list).

Regardless of the fact that cooperative and bargaining models aim to take into account the above factors, they continue to largely assume pareto-efficiency in choice outcomes (Browning and Chiappori, 1998; Apps and Rees, 1988). For cooperative models and for the case of bargaining models, efficiency refers to the condition that there is no money ultimately left on the bargaining table, or in other words, that there is no other possible solution, that would be preferred by all household members (Browning et al., 2014b). This is contradicted by empirical evidence of non-cooperative decision making processes and inefficient choice outcomes in the presence of information asymmetries and additional distribution factors that remain unaccounted for.

First, in the presence of insufficient or asymmetric information about each others' resources and preferences, household members often do not realize efficiency gains (Udry, 1996; Mazzocco, 2007; Ashraf, 2009; Dubois and Ligon, 2011; Iversen et al., 2011; Castilla and Walker, 2013; Kebede et al., 2014; Castilla, 2015; Hoel, 2015; Fiala, 2017; Castilla, 2019; Verschoor et al., 2019). Second, despite the variety of factors that have been explored as distribution factors in the decision making process, the vast majority of research in this regard has focused on the one most prominent distribution factor, namely the relative income of household members (Browning et al., 2014a; Strauss et al., 2000). Spousal control and frictions within the household as well as social norms that diminish the role of women in financial management structures are other distribution factors of a somewhat softer nature that have not been sufficiently explored (Fiala, 2017; Ambler et al., 2018; Mani, 2020).

Especially in the case of married couples across countries of the Global South, a limited observability of household finances and a strong prevalence of social norms prejudicial to women may provide potential for information asymmetries, uncooperative behaviors and a failure to realize efficiency gains (Baland and Ziparo, 2017). Ashraf (2009) experimentally elicits causal effects of observability and communication among spouses in the Philippines and finds that they behave differently when choices are private, non-private and when required to communicate. Unobservability of choices causes husbands to put money into their own accounts and observability induces them to assign money to consumption beneficial to them. In contrast, when required to communicate, men allocate money into their wives' accounts. Interestingly, she finds evidence that these treatment effects are not so much related to gender, but rather to control over finances within the household.

Fiala (2017) examined treatment effects for small business owners in Uganda, who randomly received capital through a loan or grant, or capital paired with training. He uncovered that effects were heterogeneous with regard to financial power relations within the participant's household, specifically in terms of whether the participant was likely to hide money from her spouse, as elicited by a behavioral experiment. Those women, who hid money, showed improved economic outcomes as a response to the treatment, and those, who did not, exhibited smaller effects sizes, while for men the opposite is the case.

Empirical evidence suggests that the susceptibility to conceal amounts of income or resources often coincides with the existence of information asymmetries enabled through privacy of information, unobservability of resources and the prevalence of disadvantageous social norms towards women. Specifically, it seems that privacy of information induces inefficient outcomes in those settings where spousal roles and control within the household are persistent and to some extent predefined by social norms, such that hiding behavior becomes desirable in the first place (Ashraf, 2009). A large body of literature presents evidence of different types of hiding behavior among wives in countries of the Global South, who tend to shield information about substantial amounts of resources from their spouses or from other social demands. This can involve concealing amounts of savings or assets (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Baland et al., 2011; Schaner, 2015; Schaner, 2017; Ambler et al., 2018), expenditures (Di Falco and Bulte, 2011; Castilla and Walker, 2013; Goldberg,

2017), income (Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Boltz et al., 2019; Castilla, 2019) or loans (Fiala, 2017; Riley, 2018).

Employing evidence from Kenya, Anderson and Baland (2002) found that married women with an independent income were the most likely to participate in a ROSCA (Rotating Savings and Credit Association) and argue that this may be explained by conflictual interactions within the household with regard to saving preferences. Along the same lines, empirical evidence suggests that women are willing to endure losses in order to protect information about or restrict access to their income from their husbands (Anderson and Baland, 2002; Baland et al., 2011; Schaner, 2015; Jakiela and Ozier, 2016; Boltz et al., 2019). In a field experiment with married couples in rural Kenya, Schaner (2015) found that wives prefer a private savings account over a joint account when spouses exhibited differences in saving preferences, even if that meant giving up interest. Similarly, when improving the husband's access to their bank account, women tend to stop using it (Schaner, 2017). Moreover, Riley (2018) observed that Ugandan women who received microfinance loans onto a mobile money account exhibit increased business outcomes compared to those who received a cash disbursement of the loan. This impact was the largest for the subgroup of women who perceived pressure to share money within the household.

This evidence suggests that non-cooperative models, which do not assume efficiency, might be more adequate for modeling the elements of a household's decision making process. However, there is no agreement yet on how to incorporate the aforementioned factors into such models (Hoel, 2015). Additional evidence that contributes to the further refinement of non-cooperative models of household decision making, and includes factors such as privacy of information, gender-related social norms, and the interplay with microeconomic interventions, remains an important field of research (Iversen et al., 2011).

In view of this, another potential determinant of both individual and joint decision making in married couples is spousal trust and trustworthiness, which has not yet been explored by the literature. On the one hand, spousal trust and trustworthiness might reflect distribution factors affecting pareto weights or threat points in cooperative or bargaining models, respectively. For instance, in the case of caring preferences, Browning et al. (2014b) suggest that caring for a partner resembles an increase in the partner's pareto weight, giving her a greater weight with respect to egoistic preferences. Similar considerations might be valid in the case of trust and trustworthiness, whereas one's own trust towards the partner may increase her bargaining power.

On the other hand, when considering the widespread existence of patriarchal societies in which social norms distribute most of the decision power in the husband's favor (Baland and Ziparo, 2017), spousal trust and trustworthiness might assume a different, additional role. As in precisely such societies, divorce or remarriage are rarely an option for women (ibid.), these unbalanced power relations are more likely to result in uncooperative behaviors while remaining *inside* the marriage. In light of this, spousal trust relations could arise as predictors of uncooperative behaviors, such as deliberately withholding information about

income, savings or consumption (especially by the weaker positioned household member), and thus, of the creation of information asymmetries.

The empirical evidence above suggests that an important factor related to the prevalence of such behaviors is spousal control over financial decisions within the household. While spousal trust and trustworthiness and spousal control are likely to be related, we argue that trust and trustworthiness go beyond the largely socially induced spousal power relations by capturing the degree to which these in fact influence cooperative decision making among married couples. An interesting objective for further research is to assess the relative extent to which both of these factors can predict not only the prevalence, but also the severity of uncooperative behaviors for observed choice outcomes.

B. Spousal trust in the context of household-based saving interventions

In this paper, we investigate spousal trust and trustworthiness as factors in household decision making in the context of household-based saving interventions, which offers both, a relevant and promising context in this regard. First, undersaving continues to be a prevalent issue among the poor despite its inherent benefits, suggesting that some questions are still unanswered and of high value for designing effective policy options to overcome barriers to saving (Karlan et al., 2014). These benefits and the relevance of saving have been identified by an extensive body of literature, emphasizing that saving plays a key role in enhancing welfare in the lives of the poor because of its ability to smooth consumption over irregular incomes (Deaton, 1989; Karlan et al., 2014), increase resilience in the absence of a formal insurance (Hulme et al., 2015), and promote future-oriented investments such as those in children's education (Collins et al., 2009; Rutherford, 2009).

In view of this, sufficient access to savings among the poor remains a fundamental concern. It is thus crucial that the interventions and devices introduced to the most vulnerable parts of the population in fact improve their situation effectively. If the intended effects of different types of saving interventions are sensitive to spousal intra-household dynamics, this would be of utmost importance for designing future household-based interventions and scaling up policies.

Second, we expect household-based saving interventions to be particularly sensitive to spousal intra-household dynamics, depending on the extent to which their features facilitate hiding behaviors. The empirical evidence above has shown that different types of saving devices, which all have in common access-restrictive features, can indeed facilitate hiding behaviors within the household. This was observed in the case of ROSCAs (Anderson and Baland, 2002), individual bank saving accounts as opposed to joint ones (Schaner, 2015; Schaner, 2017), and in the case of loans disbursed into mobile money accounts instead of in cash (Riley, 2018).

Consequently, if a saving device exhibits properties that allow a private usage and ultimately facilitate hiding behaviors, and if assuming that any hiding motive is amplified in the absence of spousal trust, this allows to examine spousal trust as a determinant of the extent and severity of uncooperative decision making for saving outcomes. Specifically,

given the provision of a privately used saving device as opposed to a shared one (as in Schaner, 2015), we might expect its impact on savings to vary with regard to the dimension of trust and trustworthiness among its users. Building on this, we experimentally test whether spousal trust and trustworthiness explain heterogeneity in treatment effectiveness of an additionally provided private saving device.

III Experimental design

A. Study setting

The study took place in slum communities surrounding the cities of Pune and Pimpri-Chinchwad in India's second most populated state Maharashtra. The state has a higher per capita income and a lower poverty headcount ratio than the national average. However, 20 million people (17% of the population) still lived below the poverty line in 2012, according to the World Bank's calculations using the National Social Survey (World Bank, 2017b). Given its very low ranking on the Gender Inequality Index (UNDP, 2019), gender discrimination continues to be a prevalent issue in India and also in Maharashtra. For instance, in spite of recent relative improvements in educational outcomes for women, literacy rates in Maharashtra remain 10 percentage points and the share of women with secondary or higher education 15 percentage points below those of men (World Bank, 2017a; International Institute for Population Sciences, 2018). Generally worse health outcomes for women, a high prevalence of spousal violence (one in three ever married women has experienced physical or sexual violence by her partner) and a low child sex ratio of 894 females per 1,000 males further emphasize the prevalence of gender inequalities in Maharashtra (World Bank, 2017a; International Institute for Population Sciences, 2018).

To some extent, gender inequality can also be observed in terms of adults' financial inclusion. Even though India's national financial inclusion rate is with 80% rather high, there exists a gender gap in account ownership of roughly six percentage points (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). Despite the large share of adults *owning* a bank account, inactivity among account owners is widespread as almost half of them have not made any withdrawals or deposits in the past year (ibid.). Moreover, with 190 million unbanked adults, India has the world's second largest unbanked population, of which the majority are women (60%). This emphasizes a potentially high need for additional, alternative saving devices, specifically among poorer individuals and women.

Considering the prevalence of gender inequality, a number of studies suggest that the demonstrated phenomenon of income hiding of women is also existent in India (Mayoux and Anand, 1995; Munro et al., 2014; Castilla, 2015; Bernhardt et al., 2019; Castilla, 2019; Mani, 2020). The observation that men report substantially higher cigarette, tobacco and alcohol use than women represents additional evidence supporting women's motivation to shield parts of their resources from their husband's access (Desai et al., 2010).

B. Sampling

The sample consists of 360 female (84%) and male (16%) slum dwellers, who were part of a larger randomized controlled trial (1525 participants), which was designed to evaluate the overall impact of the portable, private saving device (Steinert et al., 2020). Power calculations were only performed for the sample of the larger trial. Eligibility criteria were defined for participants to be at least 18 years old and to ensure they held financial resources that exceed their subsistence needs in order to assure that they had some potential to save money. Precisely, eligible participants were those who indicated having some income at least once per week or on a monthly basis, either through permanent employment, casual work, remittances or governmental cash transfers (ibid.). Given the aim of this study, the randomly selected subsample of 360 participants employed in this paper was subject to a third eligibility criteria, namely being married at baseline. No monetary incentives were provided to participate in the study.

C. The intervention

Developed by Steinert et al. (ibid.), the intervention aims at reducing temptation spending and encouraging saving. The central component of the intervention, named "'Aaj bachat kara, udya khush raha"' (Marathi for "Save to-day, be happy tomorrow"), is a portable saving commitment device, precisely a zip purse (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), which is individually received by each spouse. It was provided to treatment group participants and their spouses along with a stationary and jointly used commitment device (see below). Participants were encouraged to take the zip purse with them whenever they leave the house. Following the literature on saving commitment devices (Soman and Cheema, 2011), the zip purse is intended to serve as a saving reminder and psychological liability at the exact moment at which spending decisions are made, functioning via feelings of guilt and failure when violating this commitment.

The stationary saving device is a metal box, which can be opened and closed with a padlock to which both spouses received a key (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Such lockboxes have been shown to effectively promote savings in the presence of limited accessibility to a formal saving infrastructure (e.g. Karlan et al., 2014; Aggarwal et al., 2020). The lockbox was distributed to all study households ('active' control), whereas only those in the treatment group additionally received the portable commitment device.

The devices substantially differed with regard to their access-related features and usage. The lockbox was stationed somewhere inside the household and presents a single device that was accessible to both spouses alike, as each was provided with a key. Thus, even if not both spouses contributed by putting money *into* the box, they both had access to *remove* resources from it.

The zip purse, in contrast, is assigned a higher potential to conceal disposable cash. First, it was provided to each spouse individually with an intended autonomous use by each spouse. This means one device each, not one device shared by both spouses as the case

for the lockbox. Second, it is a small portable device, which could either be carried over a person's shoulder or be attached to her clothing. Thus, the purse could be carried close to the body and taken outside of the household with a some sense of privacy. Third, it is much less salient than the lockbox, both in its usage and its appearance. It is a relatively small device, which can only be distinguished from any other purse due to the earmarked purpose that had been assigned to it within the scope of the intervention. Hence, despite the fact that the zip purse does not have an individual lock, it could facilitate the (temporary) concealment of disposable cash through the above features.

During the distribution of saving devices, facilitators explained the use and purpose of the corresponding device(s), and further helped participants and their spouses to formulate a savings goal, a detailed visualized savings plan with daily or weekly targets and a timeline to reach the savings goal (Steinert et al., 2020). This additional component of the intervention was provided to all participants.

D. RCT design and timeline

The 360 participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment group (N=182), receiving both, the lockbox and the private, portable saving device, or the control group (N=178), only receiving the lockbox. The initial randomization of the larger RCT as well as of the random subsample employed in this paper were performed with Stata, stratified by sex of the participant and baseline savings. Neither participants nor program implementers were blinded due to feasibility constraints. Thus, the active control group receiving the lockbox did not only account for the standard of care, but also helped to limit risks of performance or expectancy biases (ibid.). Data was collected at baseline (November 2018 to January 2019) and endline (August to October 2019) while the saving devices were delivered to treatment and control group participants between February and April 2019.

E. Data collection and outcome variables

The data collection was conducted using standardized questionnaires, available in English and Marathi, that were administered on tablets to improve data quality and reduce respondent fatigue. Data was collected by a team of enumerators who had been recruited from local communities and were fluent in Marathi. They received an up to five-day training which covered interview techniques, research ethics and made sure that enumerators familiarized with the survey instruments (ibid.).

Interviews were conducted with participants during home visits and lasted for about 30 to 45 minutes. The interviews were held only with one spouse, i.e. the main respondent of the larger RCT. Enumerators made substantial efforts to avoid that other household members would be present during the interview, for instance via the timing of the home visits, and aimed at creating a comfortable and private environment for participants. Informed consent forms were administered and obtained from the main respondent prior to the baseline interview during recruitment home visits and additionally from the spouse prior to the distribution of devices.

The primary outcomes of interest were the participants' savings balances in Indian Rupees (INR), both in total as well as disaggregated into further subcategories of savings balances. These subcategories include bank account savings, savings in post offices or national savings centres, savings with relatives, savings kept at home, savings within a savings club, savings in mobile money accounts, lock box savings and zip purse savings (only treatment group). Savings in the lockbox and in the zip purse were measured by hand-counting money together with participants, who were not informed about the exact date and time of their endline interview. Amounts for the other categories of savings were obtained from detailed self-reported information of participants. Interviews were conducted in the absence of the respondent's spouse, which is expected to increase the accuracy of responses by removing the incentive of giving wrong information in the spouse's presence.

The survey further captured sociodemographic information, including household composition, caste, religion, and a number of wealth indicators, namely education, employment, income, household expenditures, temptation expenditures, household assets, reported outstanding debt and resilience to shocks. The survey further contains several instruments that aim to capture household power dynamics with regard to financial decision making as well as a number of questions used to construct an index to quantify self-efficacy and female empowerment. See Table A1 in the Appendix for an overview of the core survey items and constructed variables.

F. Elicitation of spousal trust and trustworthiness

To measure spousal trust and trustworthiness, a behavioral lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted with respondents and their spouses in additional home visits, after the household had been visited for the endline survey. Spousal trust and trustworthiness were quantified by a simplified binary trust game in form of a sequential prisoner's dilemma, whereas the first/second mover's decision was used to elicit the level of trust/trustworthiness (see Figure 1). Spouses were randomly selected to act as the first and second mover, respectively.

The first mover was asked to decide between two payout options, namely (A) relying on the spouse's decision to determine the final payout and accepting a potential loss in case the spouse will choose to default, or (B) defining the final payout without relying on the spouse's decision and thus a priori accepting a lower final payout. Decision (A) was used as a proxy for trusting the spouse while decision (B) was used as a proxy for mistrust. If the first mover opted for decision (A), the second mover determined the final payout by choosing (A) whether to cooperate (used as a proxy for trustworthiness) and receive equal payouts or (B) whether to default and thereby maximize the individual payout (used as a proxy for untrustworthiness). Payout amounts were defined such that, if trying to maximize her own payout, the first mover would opt for the trust option if she believed her spouse to be trustworthy with a probability of at least 50%.

Since the trust game was a sequential game and was only played once, each spouse only made one choice (single-role game). Thus, for every spouse the game yields one decision,

either in terms of trust *or* trustworthiness, depending on whether the spouse was randomly selected to be first or second mover, respectively. Choices were kept private such that both spouses made their decisions without knowledge about the other movers' choice. This yields information from 360 trust games, which were matched accordingly with the survey data from the RCT. Spouses' decisions and their role in the trust game were used to construct the heterogeneity variables of interest, which are explained in detail below.

FIGURE 1: Game tree: Binary trust game



Payouts were selected to reflect gender-specific preferences, namely embroidered handkerchiefs for female subjects and plain handkerchiefs for male subjects (see Figure A3 in the Appendix). Gender-specific payouts are crucial in order to adequately measure individual trust and trustworthiness between spouses, as interchangeable payouts might induce subjects to aim at maximizing the joint payout of both spouses instead of maximizing their own. After an extensive consultation with the local team of enumerators, the handkerchiefs were identified as the best option, given that it is very uncommon that men would use the embroidered handkerchiefs and vice versa. The payout amounts differed in the number of handkerchiefs to be received in the different scenarios determined through spouses' choices (see Figure 1 for exact payouts). The amounts were kept at reasonable levels in order to maintain an incentive to maximize the own payout, i.e. by ensuring a sufficient gain in utility of receiving an additional handkerchief.

The team of enumerators that administered this study component was deliberately different from the one that conducted the main survey data collection. To internalize the rules and procedures of the trust game and to discuss potential difficulties during its conduction in the field, the team underwent an extensive three-day training. For the conduction of the trust game during home visits, we assigned two enumerators per household instead of one in order to ensure a clean implementation. This assured the isolation of spouses from each other during their decision making processes and choice determination in the trust game as well as a detailed presentation of the choices and payouts.

It follows a justification of the described measure to quantify spousal trust and trust-

worthiness. First, we abstained from employing survey-based measures, which have not been shown to consistently correlate with experimental measures using a trust game (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000; Ashraf et al., 2003; Gächter et al., 2004; Ermisch et al., 2009; Johnson and Mislin, 2012; Banerjee, 2018). Survey-based measures are unlikely to provide an adequate measurement of the bilateral financial trust and trustworthiness that is of interest here, where trustee and trustor are spouses with a rich history of interactions. Moreover, the literature on survey-based measures of *trustworthiness* is still scarce.

Second, we decided to conduct a binary instead of a continuous version of the game, as the case in the original Berg et al trust game (Berg et al., 1995). On the one hand, we argue that the concept of trust and trustworthiness of interest for this paper is likely to be of a dichotomous nature. Specifically, we are examining spousal trust or trustworthiness with regard to household decision making and its potential to intensify hiding behaviors in the presence of the treatment. For instance, a spouse can either fully trust her partner in such decisions or not, whereas the latter is assumed to entail all intermediate levels of trust, as any absence of trust is expected to hold potential for hiding behaviors.

On the other hand, a continuous game also entails a higher complexity and thus, increases risks of an inadequate understanding, display and enforcement of the rules of the game by participants (and enumerators) in the field. Furthermore, a continuous game implies a smooth and continuous payout, which is easy to achieve with monetary payout, but more difficult for the, here crucial, gender-specific payouts. Even though the handkerchiefs *are* countable, they do not allow the fine-grained countability that can be obtained when participants receive a monetary endowment of e.g. 10$. The incremental increase in utility of an additional handkerchief diminishes faster when increasing units, than is the case for monetary endowments, limiting their suitability for a continuous game.

Third, this specific version of a trust game - a single-role binary trust game - was chosen as a result of both, methodological reasons as well as a low complexity and high feasibility in the field, which are expected to maximize the accuracy of elicited choices. Experimental evidence suggests that single-role trust games and dictator games result in significantly different measurements of trust and altruism as opposed to double-role versions: While double-role versions may generate more observations, they tend to induce downward biased measurements, which are less accurate than single-role versions in terms of capturing a subject's actual choice when acting as either first or second mover (Burks et al., 2003; Grossman et al., 2020). Moreover, a hypothetical double-role version with a subsequent random selection of the payout would be associated with a substantial increase in complexity and decrease in practicability for participants and enumerators in the field.

Finally, for a valid identification of heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness, the latter cannot be affected by the treatment, i.e. by the receipt of the private saving device. Thus, the fact that the trust game was conducted after the endline data collection may pose a threat to the identification strategy. This is assessed in detail in Chapter VI.

G. Ethical considerations

Ethical approval for this study was obtained through the University of Göttingen. As described above, the up to five-day-training of both, the survey research staff and the research team conducting the trust game in the field, covered the aspect of research ethics. This included for instance conscious behaviors in the slum communities and in participants' homes, the importance of participants' *informed* consent to taking part in the study as well as creating a private and comfortable interview atmosphere and avoiding the presence of other household members during the interview.

An important aspect to consider is the distribution of payouts to spouses after the conduction of the trust game. If roughly remembering the payout scheme of the game presented to them, participants might be able to deduct whether their partner cooperated or not from the number of handkerchiefs they received as payout. If so, this raises ethical considerations due to the possibility of harmful consequences for spouses, and more likely so for the wife, given the prevalence of social norms disadvantageous to women. Our research team aimed at mitigating this by (i) paying careful attention to the reaction of spouses after receiving the payouts, and (ii) if noticing any potentially worrisome reactions or responses, they had been instructed to post hoc distribute additional handkerchiefs to the respective spouse. Neither consultations with the enumerators on this specific issue nor the reports from field coordinators showed signs of the existence of such adverse effects, judging from the reactions among spouses.

H. Attrition

Attrition in the sample was at 1.67%, which corresponds to a total number of six participants that dropped out between the baseline and endline data collection. Given the extremely low number of attritors, their existence is neglected for the empirical analysis. Regressing an indicator variable for attrition on the treatment indicator and then adding controls shows that attrition was not differential across trialarms (p-value: 0.911).

I. Estimation strategy and econometric specification

Given a successful randomization of participants to the treatment group, the study design entails a clear identification strategy, which allows to attribute the difference in outcomes between both groups solely to the treatment. Thus, if assuming that trust as such is not affected by the treatment, we can examine the effect of receiving the private saving device for heterogeneity in terms of spousal trust by regressing the outcome of interest on the treatment indicator, interacted with the respective heterogeneity variable for spousal trust. Due to the typical right-skewness of the saving and expenditure data, we perform the core empirical analysis with high-tail 2% winsorized saving and income data. This is further addressed when results are examined for robustness.

After capturing the individual choices of both spouses in the trust game with two indicator variables, *Wife TTw* and *Husband TTw*, we use these to construct the following three main

heterogeneity variables employed in the empirical analysis. The first two are indicator variables that exclusively capture (i) the mutual absence and (ii) the mutual presence of husband's and wife's trust and trustworthiness. Mutual absence of trust and trustworthiness refers to the lowest level of spousal trust within the household, meaning that according to choices in the trust game both spouses indicated to not trust the other spouse or to not be trustworthy, depending on who was first mover. The indicator variable *No TTw* then captures this mutual absence of spousal trust (No TTw = 1) as opposed to any presence of trust or trustworthiness (No TTw = 0). Accordingly, the same procedure was conducted for the mutual presence of spousal trust resulting in the corresponding indicator variable *Mutual TTw*, which takes the value of 1 if both spouses indicated to trust the other spouse or to be trustworthy, and 0 otherwise.

Moreover, we construct a categorical variable that captures all four possible combinations of husband's and wife's individual choices in the trust game. We refer to this variable as the trust and trustworthiness index (*TTw Index*), which contains the two mutual constellations of individual choices (No TTw, Mutual TTw) and the two non-mutual combinations where one spouse trusts or is trustworthy, and the other one is not. Thus, the index can take on four possible values, which allow to make relative comparisons among the different levels of trust and trustworthiness. Specifically, it takes a value of 0 if No TTw is equal to 1, a value of 1 if Husband TTw is equal to 1 *and* Wife TTw is equal to 0, a value of 2 if Husband TTw is equal to 0 *and* Wife TTw is equal to 1, and a value of 3 if Mutual TTw is equal to 1 (see Table A2 in the Appendix for an overview of these variables).

These variables were constructed regardless of who was first mover in the trust game, while in the analysis we then additionally restrict the sample to only those trust games with the wife or the husband as first movers, respectively. In the subsample of trust games with the wife as first mover, the TTw variables measure the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness, while when the husband was first mover, they capture the wife's trustworthiness and the husband's trust.

We estimate the following main specification to examine the causal impact of the receiving the private saving device for heterogeneity in terms of spousal trust, using the variables specified above.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma TTw_i + \delta T_i \times TTw_i + \zeta Y_{i(t-1)} + \eta S'_{i(t-1)} + \theta X'_{i(t-1)} + \epsilon_{it} \qquad (1)$$

Y_{it} is the outcome of interest at endline for participant i, T_i is an indicator variable for treatment assignment, which takes the value of 1 if the participant had been assigned to the treatment group, $Y_{i(t-1)}$ is the lagged outcome at baseline, $S'_{i(t-1)}$ is a vector of stratification variables, $X'_{i(t-1)}$ is a vector of baseline covariates, and ϵ_{it} is the error term. Stratification variables are participants' sex and quintile of baseline savings, and additional baseline controls include participants' age, educational status, employment, household size and household income. TTw_i are the heterogeneity variables for spousal trust introduced above, i.e. No TTw, Mutual TTw and TTw Index, constructed from choices of spouses in

the trust game. The outcome of interest are participants' total saving balances, as well as selected subcategories of dis-aggregated saving balances, specifically bank account savings, post and national account savings and savings at home.

This specification estimates intention-to-treat (ITT) effects, meaning the average causal effect of receiving the private, portable private saving device. The main coefficient of interest is δ, i.e. the coefficient for the interaction term between the aforementioned TTw variables and the treatment indicator. The interaction term allows to assess the ITT effect for heterogeneity across distinct subgroups in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness, whereas the respective coefficient corresponds to the *difference* in the ITT effects between subgroups in terms of spousal trust. Consequently, β represents the ITT effect if the respective TTw variable equals 0, and γ corresponds to the average correlation between the respective TTw variable and the outcome for control group participants.

IV Trust game results

The results from the binary trust game are illustrated in Figure 2 (and in more detail in Table A3 in the Appendix), which shows the mean values of the trust variables Husband TTw, Wife TTw, Mutual TTw and No TTw constructed for the empirical analysis. Out of the 360 trust games, 214 were conducted with the wife as first mover and 146 with the husband as first mover. Thus, in 214 cases we can analyze the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness and in 146 cases the wife's trustworthiness and the husband's trust. In this brief analysis of the trust game results, we do not distinguish between whether the main respondent for the survey was the husband or wife, given that the game was played with both spouses and both indicated their respective choice.

Across the entire sample, approximately 53% of the first movers and 60% of the second movers chose to cooperate (not in figure). Hence, the overall level of trustworthiness significantly exceeded the overall level of trust (p-value: 0.05). Compared to the only other trust game performed among married couples in a country of the Global South (Castilla, 2015), the absolute levels of trust and trustworthiness in this study were quite similar, whereas relative levels were somewhat different. Since the trust game performed by Castilla (ibid.) was continuous, this only allows to compare the average sent or returned proportion in the continuous game to the mean value of trust or trustworthiness in our trust game. She found that first movers send on average 57.0% of their endowment while second movers return 53.7%. Thus, in the continuous game by Castilla (ibid.) the level of trust was higher than the level of trustworthiness while in the binary trust game in the study at hand the opposite was the case. However, magnitudes were within the same range of 52% to 60%, and both studies showed substantially higher measures of trustworthiness than observed in trust games among strangers (Camerer, 2011).

More relevant for this study are disaggregated levels of trust and trustworthiness by the spouse's identity, i.e. by husband and wife. Regardless of their role in the trust game, husbands indicated a significantly higher level of trust or trustworthiness (60%) than wives

(53%). This pattern holds also when distinguishing between trust and trustworthiness. With 62% of first movers and 59% of second movers cooperating, the average levels of trust and trustworthiness among husbands were not significantly different from each other, but equal to or larger than those among wives. While the average level of trustworthiness among wives equaled the average level of trust among husbands (62%), it is the wives' trust (47%) that was substantially and significantly lower than average levels of both, trust and trustworthiness, among husbands (p-value: 0.01).

In terms of a mutual presence of trust and trustworthiness, the results show that despite the high levels of more than 60% of trustworthiness among wives and trust among husbands, their decisions matched in only 38% of the respective subsample of trust games. Coherent with the low levels of trust among wives, the mean value of mutually present trust and trustworthiness was significantly lower in the subsample of games where the wife was the first mover (29%, p-value: 0.07).

FIGURE 2: Trust game results

Notes: Mean values by mover in trust game (horizontal lines represent overall mean for each variable).

The lowest level of trust and trustworthiness - i.e. neither wife nor husband indicated cooperation - was observed in approximately one out of five trust games. In line with the above, this value was substantially higher (22%) when it was the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness that were measured than in the opposite combination (14%, p-value: 0.07). It follows that the highest possible level of trust and trustworthiness was on average more often observed than the lowest one, whereas this difference is driven by the subsample of trust games with the husband as first mover, and thus, by the wife's trustworthiness that exceeded her substantially lower average level of trust. Otherwise, if looking at the combinations of the wife's trust and husband's trustworthiness, the mutual absence of trust and trustworthiness was on average not significantly less likely than their

mutual presence (22% vs. 29%).

These results are also reflected in mean values of the categorical trust and trustworthiness index (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Ranging from 0 to 3 with an average observed value of 1.66, there is a significant difference between subgroups in terms of spouses' roles in the trust game. While the index denoted an average value of 1.85 for the subsample with the husband as first mover, this value is by almost a third of a category lower when the wife's trust was measured (1.54, p-value < 0.01).

V Treatment heterogeneity in terms of spousal trust

A. Baseline characteristics and randomization verification

Table A4 presents an overview of participants' baseline characteristics, in the full sample and in each study arm. More than 80% of sample participants were female, revealing a higher willingness of women to take part in the survey. The vast majority of the sample (76%) reported being Hindu, while around 12% were Buddhist and only 4% were Muslim.

Study participants were exposed to a rather high degree of poverty at baseline, given that every third respondent indicated to be unemployed, 54% reported belonging to a backward caste or scheduled tribe, and more than 40% had not finalized any form of primary or secondary education. The average monthly income of study participants across the entire sample equals 9,800.26 INR, which is equivalent to approximately 137.00 USD. In contrast, with an average amount of 4,914.83 INR (approx. 69.00 USD) the baseline level of total savings was already quite high. The majority of roughly 60% of these savings were kept in participants' bank accounts.

The result of a joint orthogonality F-test to assess baseline balance across study arms provides evidence in favor of an effective randomization ($F = 0.381$, see Table A4 in the Appendix). None of the tested baseline characteristics differ significantly between treatment and control group when comparing differences in means using t-tests.

There are small differences across groups in terms of educational attainment, total savings balances and a notable, but insignificant difference in terms of participants' outstanding debt. With an average amount of 5,317.94 INR, control group participants reported a slightly higher level of baseline savings than treatment group participants, who reported an average amount of 4,518.61 INR. This difference is driven mainly by savings held in bank accounts. The only substantial difference across groups can be observed in terms of outstanding debt, which is notably higher in the control group (9,517.68 INR) than in the treatment group (5,797.80 INR). However, this difference is not significant at common levels of statistical significance. Furthermore, recall that in the empirical specifications we control for participants' quintile of baseline savings, sex, age, educational status, employment, household size and income.

B. The impact on savings

This section presents the core findings of a heterogeneity in treatment effects of the private, portable saving device on saving outcomes, using experimentally elicited dimensions of spousal trust and trustworthiness. The results of estimating Equation (1) are reported in Table 1 and Table 2. The OLS regressions employ the full sample of 360 observations and the dependent variable in both tables are participants' total savings balances. We first report the results of using the indicator variables for a mutual presence or mutual absence of spousal trust and trustworthiness (i.e. Mutual TTw and No TTw) in Table 1, while Table 2 employs the categorical variable TTw Index to assess heterogeneity. All regressions include the lagged amount of total savings at baseline, stratification variables and baseline controls.

Panel A of Table 1 reports heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of a mutual absence of spousal trust or trustworthiness and Panel B reports heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of their mutual presence. Column 1 in both Panels estimates the average effect of receiving the private saving device (ITT effect), revealing that the treatment does not have a statistically significant impact on the endline amount of total savings of study participants at common levels of statistical significance. The coefficient suggests that the receipt of the private saving device reduced the amount of total savings in treatment group participants on average by 540.55 INR. Considering an average amount of endline savings of 7,240.53 INR in the control group, this effect is rather small in magnitude.

However, note that within both groups, the average amount of total savings balances significantly increased by approximately 40% during the study period (not in table). Savings of control group participants increased from 5,351.96 INR to 7,436.78 INR (p-value: 0.02), while those of treatment group participants increased from 4,508.31 INR to 6,334.37 INR (p-value: 0.02). Moreover, even though bank account savings make up the majority of the aggregate amount of total savings across groups (see Table A4), this increase is not driven by bank account savings or another single subcategory of savings specifically, but rather by moderate increases across categories.

Adding the respective heterogeneity variable of spousal trust changes neither insignificance nor magnitude of the ITT effect in Column 1. However, while both, the mutual absence as well as the mutual presence of spousal trust and trustworthiness, are on average positively related to the endline amount of total savings, the respective coefficient is more than three times larger in magnitude in its absence (1,289.29 INR vs. 356.37, column 2). More importantly, both coefficients are statistically insignificant at all common significance levels. Here we do not yet distinguish between first and second mover in the trust game, i.e. between whether trust or trustworthiness was measured by husband or wife, respectively.

The remaining columns in both panels include the interaction term of interest between the treatment indicator and the respective trust indicator (i.e. Mutual TTw and No TTw). The results from Panel A reveal that the treatment has a large and positive statistically significant effect on total savings for the subgroup of married couples, who do not seem to trust each other or be trustworthy, relative to those couples who do exhibit some

kind of trust or trustworthiness towards each other (p-value: 0.05). When employing the entire sample regardless of roles of spouses in the trust game (column 3), treatment group participants in the subgroup of low trust couples reported an average amount of endline savings of 8,847.97 INR, while in the subgroup of high trust couples average endline savings amount to 5,766.23 INR. This results from a large and positive ITT effect of receiving the private saving device in the subgroup of low trust couples (marginal effect: +4,456.13 INR, p-value: 0.12), whereas savings in high trust couples on average decreased as a result of the treatment (marginal effect: -1,748.22 INR, p-value: 0.15).

TABLE 1: Treatment heterogeneity by mutual spousal trust and trustworthiness

PANEL A: Mutual absence of spousal trust and trustworthiness Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-540.55	-527.13	-1748.22	-1826.17	-1627.71
	(1078.75)	(1084.98)	(1195.30)	(1472.47)	(2008.05)
No TTw		1289.29	-1710.57	-2563.27	-488.02
		(1513.10)	(1499.47)	(1807.25)	(3178.93)
Treatment × No TTw			6204.35*	9687.46**	2129.67
			(3198.87)	(4569.76)	(4914.87)
Lagged outcome	0.37**	0.37**	0.35*	0.37*	0.26
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.31)
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.26	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.21	0.05
PANEL B: Mutual presence of spousal trust and trustworthiness Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-540.55	-517.90	-1115.44	-153.01	-1319.26
	(1078.75)	(1084.67)	(1353.61)	(1727.78)	(2285.03)
Mutual TTw		356.37	-539.16	-904.54	1667.50
		(1101.01)	(1536.99)	(1565.89)	(2687.72)
Treatment × Mutual TTw			1851.67	1028.09	1901.79
			(2206.77)	(2454.75)	(3681.53)
Lagged outcome	0.37**	0.37**	0.37**	0.41*	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.30)
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.22	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.06
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	338	338	338	202	136
Mean control	7240.53	7240.53	7240.53	6946.68	7807.61
	(855.24)	(855.24)	(855.24)	(1003.21)	(1601.04)

Notes: Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The significance and magnitude of the interaction coefficient in column 4 and the insignificance and smaller magnitude of the one in column 5 indicate that this effect is driven by those couples in which the wife does not trust her husband and the husband does not seem to be trustworthy (column 4), rather than by the opposite constellation (column 5). When restricting the sample to trust games with the wife as first mover, participants' endline savings in the subgroup of treatment group couples with an untrustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife were with an average amount of 11,579.00 INR twice as high as those of higher trust couples (5,817.69 INR). This results from a large and positive average ITT effect of receiving the purse in this subgroup of low-trust couples (marginal effect: +7,861.29 INR, p-value: 0.06), whereas among couples with higher levels of spousal trust, participants' savings on average decreased compared to control group participants (marginal effect: -1,826.17 INR, p-value: 0.22). The respective interaction coefficient in column 4 is significant at the 5% level (p-value: 0.04), using naive p-values.

The results for heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of a mutual presence of spousal trust and trustworthiness (Mutual TTw) in Panel B reveal that there is no statistically significant heterogeneity for this subgroup of married couples. However, the direction of the effect is in all three cases positive, suggesting that the treatment has on average a positive effect on total savings for the subgroup of married couples who indicated mutual trust and trustworthiness towards each other, relative to those couples who did not. Consequently, the large and statistically significant heterogeneous effects for low-trust couples illustrated above must originate from relatively much lower savings in the subgroup of couples with *non-mutual* combinations of trust and trustworthiness.

In order to assess this further, Table 2 estimates Equation (1) by employing the categorical variable TTw Index to examine heterogeneity in treatment effects. Recall that TTw Index ranges from 0 to 3 (see Table A2), whereas coefficients are interpreted relative to the reference category, which we define as TTw Index = 0 (i.e. equivalent to No TTw = 1), given the results of Table 1.

The core findings are reported in columns 3 to 5 after adding the trust-treatment interaction terms for the respective categories of TTw Index. First, except for one magnitude-wise not very meaningful coefficient, all interaction coefficients are negative. This suggests that, relative to the subgroup of low-trust couples, the private saving device reduced total savings balances in all other subgroups of possible spousal trust and trustworthiness combinations. This includes couples with a mutual presence of trust or trustworthiness (TTw Index = 3), as well as couples in which either the husband or the wife did not cooperate in the trust game.

Second, the only significant interaction coefficients, which are also by far the ones with the largest magnitude, are those for TTw Index = 1, i.e. for the subgroup of couples where the husband cooperated and the wife did not cooperate in terms of choices in the trust game (p-value: 0.01). When distinguishing between first and second mover, this effect is driven by couples with a trustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife, rather than by the opposite combination (cp. columns 4 and 5). When employing the sample

of trust games with the wife as first mover (column 4), treatment group participants in the subgroup of couples with a trustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife reported an average amount of endline savings of 4,896.18 INR. In contrast, in the subgroup of low-trust couples with not only a non-trusting wife, but also an *untrustworthy* husband, average endline savings were more than twice as high (11,579.00 INR). This results from a large, positive and statistically significant ITT effect of receiving the private saving device in the subgroup of low-trust couples with both, a non-trusting wife and an untrustworthy husband (marginal effect: +7,440.33 INR, p-value: 0.08), whereas savings for couples with instead a *trustworthy* husband significantly decreased on average as a result of the treatment (marginal effect: -7,365.15 INR, p-value: 0.02). The respective interaction coefficient in column 4 is statistically significant at the 1% level, using naive p-values.

TABLE 2: Impact on savings: Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-540.55	-444.14	4302.69	7440.33*	384.00
	(1078.75)	(1099.34)	(2886.35)	(4197.23)	(4526.55)
TTw index = 1		-545.20	4477.99*	6303.28**	-371.55
		(1834.52)	(2499.78)	(3066.82)	(3952.63)
TTw index = 2		-3142.35*	-1064.00	-1814.40	-914.92
		(1645.38)	(1712.35)	(1575.26)	(4652.28)
TTw index = 3		-823.32	1001.06	1108.08	1086.48
		(1640.38)	(1647.38)	(1722.81)	(3357.59)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			-9803.67**	-14805.48***	-1710.40
			(3955.04)	(5368.86)	(5915.07)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			-4327.63	-4568.06	-3003.79
			(3256.47)	(4627.38)	(6098.05)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			-3688.05	-6729.03	101.83
			(3414.92)	(4640.75)	(5340.19)
Lagged outcome	0.37**	0.37**	0.34*	0.38**	0.26
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.31)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.30	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.15	0.17	0.24	0.04
Observations	338	338	338	202	136
Mean control	7240.53	7240.53	7240.53	6946.68	7807.61
	(855.24)	(855.24)	(855.24)	(1003.21)	(1601.04)

Notes: Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

The results from Table 1 and Table 2 suggest that the private saving device substantially increased participants' total amount of endline savings for the subgroup of couples with the lowest level of trust, relative to those with any higher level of trust. This effect is driven by the constellation of couples with an untrustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife, rather than by the opposite constellation. While reinforcing this finding, Table 2 additionally reveals that the crucial determinant of the heterogeneity for this subgroup of low-trust couples might be the husband's untrustworthiness in the presence of a non-trusting wife, rather than vice versa. This heterogeneity pattern is visualized in Figure 3 below.

These same analyses were conducted (i) only with the subsample of female participants and (ii) with dis-aggregated savings balances as the dependent variable, precisely bank account savings, post and national account savings as well as savings kept at home. When restricting the sample to female participants, we find the same heterogeneity pattern as in Table 1 and Table 2, both in terms of direction and statistical significance, whereas the magnitude of coefficients is even larger than in the full sample (see Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix). Given that 84% of the sample are female, this is not necessarily surprising, but there exists still a possibility that very strong effects in the much smaller male sample empirically distort average effects. Even though we are not able to perform the heterogeneity analysis for the subsample of male participants due to the small sample size, the results in Table A5 and Table A6 clearly indicate that the same core heterogeneity is prevalent in the subsample of female participants.

A dis-aggregation of total savings suggests that the heterogeneous effects in Table 1 and Table 2 are driven by the less easily accessible subcategories of savings rather than by savings at home, however in terms of magnitude more so by bank account savings than by savings in post or national saving centers (see Tables A7 to A12 in the Appendix). While the heterogeneity pattern in bank account savings and post or national account savings is identical to the one for total savings in terms of direction and statistical significance, we find an exact opposite directional pattern in the case of savings at home, though not statistically significant and evidently much smaller in magnitude. Specifically, savings at home were on average relatively larger as a result of the treatment in the subgroup of high-trust couples.

Recall that in the overall increase across groups, there was not one individual category of savings that accounted for the overall significant difference between baseline and endline. That includes bank account savings, even though they held the largest proportion of savings at baseline. Hence, the magnitude-wise strong effects on bank account savings are in fact likely to be a particular feature of a heterogeneity in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness, and not just a general pattern that would be expected from a saving intervention, which in theory can also lead to an increase in bank account savings above other saving categories. Both of these additional findings support hiding behaviors of wives facilitated by the private saving device as a potentially relevant channel driving the heterogeneous treatment effects in low-trust couples.

FIGURE 3: Marginal treatment effects across subgroups of spousal trust 90% CIs

Notes: Average marginal treatment effects across TTw Index, only using trust games with the wife as first mover.

C. Discussion of hiding channel

This section employs evidence from within the treatment group to examine income hiding or concealment behaviors as a possible channel driving the heterogeneous treatment effects revealed above. The prevalence of hiding behavior was quantified with an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 'This purse helps me to keep money for myself and not to give it to other people (my partner, children, friends, ...)', and 0 otherwise.

167 out of 182 treatment group participants responded to the relevant survey question and 41% of those indicated to agree or strongly agree with the hiding usage of the private saving device. A comparison of the sample of female and the (much smaller) sample of male respondents reveals that there is a substantial difference in the proportion of individuals who agreed or strongly agreed with the above statement. Specifically, while approximately 44% of female respondents indicated a hiding usage of the purse, only 24% of male respondents did so. Note that - as opposed to the trust game - the survey data collection was conducted only with the main respondent and in the absence of her or his spouse. Thus, incentives to lie induced by the pressure of the partner's presence were kept low. Moreover, there is only a very small positive correlation (0.01) between low-trust couples and respondents' agreement with the hiding usage of the purse. It is thus rather unlikely that the mutual absence of trust and trustworthiness among spouses is an initial *predictor* of the practicing of any hiding behaviors. However, the low-trust environment might induce a higher effectiveness of practiced hiding behavior in the sense of actually realizing increased savings of hiding participants.

In view of this, we estimate the following empirical specification, employing only the subsample of observations from within the treatment group.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \tau H_{it} + \gamma TTw_i + \lambda H_{it} \times TTw_i + \zeta Y_{i(t-1)} + \eta S'_{i(t-1)} + \theta X'_{i(t-1)} + \epsilon_{it}. \quad (2)$$

H_{it} is the indicator variable used to quantify hiding behavior, all else is equal to the notation in Equation (1). The coefficient of interest is λ, which allows to assess the above claim of hiding behavior being a channel for the observed heterogeneity in saving outcomes, because the degree of effectiveness of such behaviors for increasing savings may depend on the level of spousal trust and trustworthiness. Given the results above, we employ as heterogeneity variable of interest (TTw_i) the indicator for a mutual absence of spousal trust and trustworthiness (No TTw). The evidence from this exercise is non-causal, given that we can only perform this analysis with observations from within the treatment group.

Furthermore, we restrict the sample only to those respondents whose spouse did not have access to their private, portable saving device, as reported by respondents themselves. 8.24% of treatment group participants did indicate that their spouse has access to their private saving device and were thus excluded from this part of the analysis, as otherwise the device would not properly facilitate hiding behaviors.

Table 3 estimates Equation (2) on participants' total savings balances, employing (i) the full sample of treatment group participants (Panel A), as well as (ii) the subsample of female participants within treatment group (Panel B). The core results suggest that individuals, who indicated a hiding usage of the purse, reported on average substantially and higher amounts of total savings in the subgroup of low-trust couples, relative to couples with higher levels of trust. This holds in the full treatment group sample and in the subsample of female participants (column 3 in both panels).

Treatment group participants who were engaged in hiding behaviors reported an average amount of endline savings of 11,756.91 INR in the subgroup of low-trust couples, while their counterparts in the subgroup of higher-trust couples reported only approximately half of this amount on average (5,636.20 INR). Total savings balances for female participants across these subgroups follow this pattern and are magnitude-wise very similar. Similarly to our main results, these effects are clearly driven by the treatment group participants with a non-trusting wife and an untrustworthy husband (p-values < 0.1, column 4 in both panels).

TABLE 3: Hiding effectiveness channel: Total savings balance

PANEL A: Full treatment group sample Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hiding	158.46	-79.19	-1947.11	-3380.96	1398.74
	(1699.60)	(1551.76)	(1564.94)	(2189.92)	(2956.30)
No TTw		2543.80	-2563.62	-2196.58	-2845.60
		(2882.03)	(1686.35)	(2438.94)	(3007.84)
No TTw × Hiding			11001.35*	16930.84*	-1147.39
			(6030.14)	(9253.36)	(4224.37)
Lagged outcome	0.17	0.16	0.21	0.42	0.12
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)
R^2	0.09	0.10	0.15	0.29	0.13
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.18	-0.06
Observations	144	144	144	81	63
PANEL B: Female treatment group sample Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hiding	670.30	316.77	-1320.50	-3714.97*	1048.72
	(1814.85)	(1646.92)	(1581.00)	(2220.57)	(3088.72)
No TTw		4190.60	-1345.90	-3941.14	-1399.13
		(3272.13)	(1496.75)	(2897.75)	(2341.04)
No TTw × Hiding			10640.50	19097.40*	-2324.85
			(6538.40)	(9644.20)	(3955.57)
Lagged outcome	0.40	0.41	0.44	0.61*	0.28
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.28)
R^2	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.32	0.08
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.22	-0.15
Observations	128	128	128	76	52
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Estimation employs only observations from within the treatment group and only those where the spouse did not have access to the portable savings device, as indicated by participants. Hiding is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the purse helps her to keep money to herself and not to give it to other people. Columns 4 and 5 in both panels restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). All regressions include the stratification variable baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Tables A13 and A14 in the Appendix repeat this same analysis for disaggregated savings balances, specifically savings in post offices or national saving centres, bank account savings, and savings at home. For bank account savings and savings in post offices or national

saving centres, the heterogeneity pattern in terms of direction and relative magnitude of coefficients is identical to the one in Table 3 and also driven by the subgroup of trust games with the wife as first mover. Even though the respective coefficients are only statistically significant for post or national account savings, their magnitude is substantially larger in the coefficients for bank account savings.

When considering all trust games regardless of who was first or second mover, participants who were engaged in hiding behaviors reported an average amount of bank account savings at endline of 7,381.82 INR in the subgroup of low-trust couples. Their counterparts in the subgroup of higher-trust couples reported an average amount that corresponds to only slightly more than a third of this value (2,680.78 INR). Coherently, the endline amounts of post or national account savings mirror this pattern at a smaller magnitude. Moreover, in both cases this pattern intensifies when only employing the sample of trust games with the wife as first mover, while it is absent in those trust games with the husband as first mover. If considering this respective subgroup of low-trust couples with a non-trusting wife and an untrustworthy husband, average amounts of endline savings in bank and post or national accounts jointly account for approximately 70% of the *total* average amount of endline savings analyzed in Table 3. In contrast, the there is no statistically significant heterogeneity and magnitude-wise no meaningful effects for savings kept at home.

This evidence from within the treatment group indicates that participants' reported hiding behavior was only consequential for increasing total savings in low-trust couples. This heterogeneity is (i) driven by couples in which the wife does not trust her husband and the husband is not trustworthy, (ii) relatively stronger for the subsample of female, rather than male, treatment group participants, and (iii) driven by less easily accessible categories of savings, i.e. bank account and post or national accounts savings, as opposed to savings at home. In view of the results in the previous section, we interpret this as strong evidence in favor of hiding behavior being an important channel behind the treatment heterogeneity on savings outcomes for low-trust couples. Given the spacial constraints of the zip purse to store large amounts of money, it appears as likely that the device might have instead served as a temporary storage of disposable cash, before this is transferred to participants' bank, post or national accounts, which are less easy to immediately access by the husband.

The above findings remain robust when using the originally measured categorical variable in terms of respondents' *degree* of agreement, instead of the indicator variable (see Table A15 in the Appendix). Moreover, relaxing the restriction related to the spouse's access to the private saving device slightly reduces statistical significance and magnitude of coefficients (cp. Table A16). This is intuitive when assuming that a spouse's occasional access could diminish the degree of effective hiding behaviors, e.g. by removing money from the purse.

VI Robustness

A. Spousal trust and trustworthiness as heterogeneity variables

The identification strategy demands that spousal trust and trustworthiness, as elicited by the trust game at endline, remain unaffected by the treatment, i.e. by the introduction of the portable, private saving device. We address this potential thread to identification both theoretically and empirically.

First, we argue that the particular concept of spousal trust and trustworthiness we aim to measure are rather rigid concepts related to habits, which presumably do not change very easily over time. In terms of generalized trust, i.e. a more abstract trust in people including anonymous strangers (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009), there is a long-ongoing debate about whether trust and trustworthiness are rigid or malleable concepts (Paxton and Glanville, 2015). Some suggest trust to be an unwavering innate or early obtained psychological trait (Erikson, 1993; Becker, 1996; Jones, 1996; Couch and Jones, 1997; Uslaner, 1999; Uslaner, 2002), while others argue that trust is a dynamic summation of past and current social experiences (Rotter, 1971; Offe, 1999; Hardin, 2002; Macy and Sato, 2002; Yosano and Hayashi, 2005; Glanville and Paxton, 2007; Van Lange et al., 2014).

In the more relevant case of particularized trust, i.e. an intimate form of trust toward people close to oneself (Freitag and Traunmüller, 2009), most claim that it is formed based on regular interactions with these known people. In the specific case of trust and trustworthiness among spouses, trustee and trustor are exposed to frequent and extensive daily social interactions. The conducted trust game in our study creates a scenario that allows us to measure financial trust or trustworthiness related to the sharing of resources among spouses, which resembles existing recurring situations in daily decision making with each another (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson, 2010). Even if the treatment does in fact facilitate hiding behaviors among low-trust couples, this would most likely not affect these recurring situations or routines in a way that would change the already existing spousal trust relations. In view of this, we argue that the spousal trust and trustworthiness of interest here are unlikely to be substantially affected by the treatment. This is reinforced by the fact that we conceptualized spousal trust and trustworthiness as dichotomies, which would require a major change to affect their current level.

Second, we draw on additional evidence on the incidence of spousal conflict with regard to financial decisions in the household, which could serve as a proxy to assess the impact of the treatment on spousal trust and trustworthiness. The categorical variable for spousal conflict was derived from the statement 'When it comes to money, how often is there conflict between you and your partner?', with the possible answers ranging from 'never' (1) to 'very often' (5). As opposed to spousal trust, this variable was measured both at baseline and endline survey data collection. If spousal conflict in financial decisions presents indeed an adequate proxy in this regard, then a statistically insignificant treatment effect on spousal conflict would provide supportive evidence in favor of spousal trust being

unaffected by the treatment and thus, in favor of a valid identification of heterogeneous effects. The results of this exercise are reported in Table A17 in the Appendix and suggest that spousal conflict is unaffected by the treatment, noting a negative, but small, statistically insignificant coefficient.

Finally, an assessment of trust and trustworthiness across treatment and control group is not a useful approach here, given that we do not observe their baseline levels, which are expected to be important predictors of the respective endline levels according to the stated concepts of spousal trust and trustworthiness.

B. CACE estimates

For an assessment of the robustness of the reported ITT estimates, we estimate IV regressions to retrieve CACE estimates for the heterogeneous treatment effects in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness observed in Tables 1 and 2. To do so, we instrument self-reported usage of the private saving device with the treatment dummy, i.e. being assigned to the treatment (cp. Steinert et al., 2020).

Judging from F-Statistics and Sanderson-Windmeijer χ^2, first stage results suggest that treatment assignment has generally a high relevance as an instrument for the actual usage of the purse. Second stage results show an overall pattern that is very similar to the ITT estimates in terms of direction, statistical significance, relative and roughly also absolute magnitude of the effects (see Tables A18 and A19 in the Appendix).

The only noteworthy difference between ITT and CACE estimates is the larger absolute magnitude of the latter. Precisely, the magnitude of the respective ITT coefficients corresponds to only between 48% and 64% of the magnitude of the CACE coefficients. This is intuitively expected for complier analyses, given that they consider the actual *usage* of the purse instead of merely treatment *assignment*. Thus, already positive and significant ITT effects are likely to translate into even larger effects for actual compliers.

C. Spousal control as alternative heterogeneity variable

Third, we consider spousal control about financial decision making in the household as a potential alternative heterogeneity variable. If spousal trust and trustworthiness and spousal control within the household are correlated, and considering the prominent role of the latter in the evidence on hiding behaviors, one may argue that the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects is in fact driven by differential levels of spousal control as an omitted variable.

This is captured with an indicator variable about the wife's involvement in financial decision making in the household ('Are you involved in decisions about money in your home?'), which was thus only collected for female participants. In roughly 66% of female participants, the mutual absence of trust and trustworthiness and spousal control were indeed aligned, i.e. the wife indicated not to be involved in financial decisions and concurrently both spouses did not cooperate in the trust game (or vice versa).

Table A20 reports the results of including spousal financial control as a control variable as well as a potential alternative heterogeneity variable. Our main results remain robust, both in magnitude and statistical significance. As a heterogeneity variable, spousal financial control indicates that the treatment was not significantly more or less successful in households that differ with regard to the wife's involvement in the financial decision making process. Interestingly, female participants in the control group report significantly lower savings at endline if the wife had indicated not to be involved in decision making about money in the household. This seems to account for a substantial proportion of the negative variation in reported savings for control group participants, which had initially been captured by the coefficient for a mutual absence of spousal trust and trustworthiness. However, this does not affect the observed treatment heterogeneity in this regard.

D. Sensitivity to outliers and quantile regressions

We further assess the robustness of the main results with respect to the typical right-skewness of saving and expenditure data, which is also prevalent in this sample. To account for this, the entire empirical analysis was conducted using high-tail 2% winsorized saving and income data. We re-estimate the main specifications using initial, unwinsorized data as well as trimmed and winsorized data at different levels, and moreover perform quantile regressions to evaluate the robustness of the core results. That is, in addition to the estimation results using unwinsorized data, we present the main coefficients of interest obtained from regressions using (i) high-tail 2%-trimmed data in order to directly compare trimming and winsorization at the same level, and (ii) high-tail 1%- and 5%-winsorized data in order to compare winsorization across different levels. The results of this exercise are reported in Table A21 in the Appendix.

The coefficients based on regressions employing the initial, unwinsorized data as well as when employing 1% and 5% winsorized data indicate the same overall pattern of heterogeneity as the main results using the high-end 2% winsorized data. The direction of interaction coefficients are identical and the statistical significance for the crucial sample of trust games with the wife as first mover remains, however at a lower level. The magnitude of effects decreases immensely with the level of winsorization, emphasizing that effects are most likely driven by the higher tails of the distribution. Nevertheless, the degree of magnitude still remains relatively high.

When obtaining coefficients from regressions using high-tail 2%-trimmed data, the heterogeneity still reflects the observed pattern from those regressions using winsorized data, at least in terms of direction and partly also magnitude. While the interaction coefficient for couples with a trustworthy husband and a non-trusting wife (i.e. TTw Index = 1) remains statistically significant (Panel B), the statistical significance of the coefficient estimating a heterogeneity in the subgroup of low-trust couples (i.e. No TTw) disappears (Panel A).

To further assess the claim that the results might be driven by the high tails of the distribution, we examine distributional treatment effects by performing quantile regressions for the 25^{th}, 50^{th} and 75^{th} percentile of the distribution as well as for the very high and

very low ends of the distribution, i.e. the 2.5^{th}, 90^{th} and 97.5^{th} percentiles. The results are reported in Table A22 in the Appendix.

Across all reported percentiles, the direction of the respective interaction coefficients is identical to the heterogeneity pattern suggested in the core findings, i.e. coefficients are all positive. However, the magnitude of coefficients across percentiles differs substantially. This difference in the magnitude of effects is particularly pronounced for the very high tail of the distribution. At least to some extent this is to be expected, given the right-skewness of the saving data and thus, the much lower availability of financial resources among the broad majority of the distribution compared to those at the top percentiles.

In terms of statistical significance, the pattern is somewhat different than the one suggested by the main analysis. There are statistically significant interaction coefficients for the very low tail of the distribution (i.e. 2.5^{th} percentile), no statistical significances for coefficients in the 25^{th}, 50^{th} and 75^{th} percentiles, while the strongest statistical significance is observed for those interaction coefficients at the high tails of the distribution (i.e. 90^{th} and 97.5^{th}).

The results from the quantile regressions largely reinforce what was already indicated by the results using unwinsorized data as well as from employing winsorized and trimmed data at different levels. Specifically, the main heterogeneity seems to be driven by the higher tails of the distribution in terms of statistical significance and, evidently, magnitude. Interestingly and opposite to this pattern, we also find statistically significant heterogeneous effects among the extremely low tail of the distribution. This is further discussed below. The overall pattern in terms of the direction of the effects remains the same across all reported percentiles of the distribution.

E. The spousal nature of the heterogeneity

A final robustness check repeats the main heterogeneity analysis of ITT effects for total savings with an alternative random sample of married couples, in which the trust game was played between our study participant (either the wife or the husband of the married couple), and another adult household member, instead of with the spouse. This was done in order to assess whether the main results were driven by *spousal* trust specifically, as then no such effects or at least much weaker effects should be observed in this alternative trust game sample.

The alternative sample of married couples comprises 137 participants, who, as in the main sample, had been randomly assigned to treatment and control group. Trust games were played between the participant (in most cases female, i.e. the wife of a married couple) and another adult household member, who had access to the stationary saving device.

In order to compare these results with the ones from the main analysis one needs to take into account the identity of the spouse who is playing with the household member, which means analyzing participants separately by gender. Given the small proportion of male participants, we only analyze the subsample of trust games with female participants, i.e. trust games between the wife and a household member. This is not really a limitation,

given that the main effects in savings were driven by female participants.

The results of the heterogeneity analysis of ITT effects for this alternative trust game sample are reported in Tables A24 and A25 in the Appendix (see Table A23 for baseline balance). Overall, there is no clear significant heterogeneity in total savings in terms of trust and trustworthiness between the wife and the other household member. The results do indicate a pattern of heterogeneity in terms of direction and magnitude of the effects, which is however only to a very limited extent similar to the observed spousal heterogeneity, while partly signaling opposing effects. Even though a positive coefficient for low-trust combinations in the subgroup of trust games with the female participant as first mover is coherent with the results for *spousal* trust and trustworthiness, the negative and large interaction coefficient for the subgroup with the other household member as first mover contradicts these. This is confirmed when examining heterogeneity using TTw Index, which presents an opposing directional pattern that is partly even statistically significant. Generally, the heterogeneity patterns for non-spousal trust and trustworthiness relations seem to support that the observed heterogeneity in the core analysis is a result of spousal relations specifically.

VII Concluding Remarks

This paper empirically investigated the role of spousal trust and trustworthiness in household financial decision making in light of its potentially incentivizing effect on the creation of information asymmetries, specifically in the context of saving promotion interventions. In doing so, we employed evidence from a randomized controlled trial of a saving promotion intervention in India that involved two types of saving devices, a shared lockbox received by all participants, and a private zip purse, only received by treatment group participants. After experimentally eliciting trust and trustworthiness by means of a binary trust game, we examine ITT effects of the private saving device for heterogeneity in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness to shed light on their potential role as factors in household decision making.

The findings suggest that spousal trust and trustworthiness relations can substantially and significantly influence the impact of different types of saving devices on savings balances. We especially emphasize the role of access-related features of saving promotion tools and suggest that the manner of usage of individually as opposed to mutually accessible devices is subject to differential underlying circumstances in terms of spousal trust. The core results indicate that the additional provision of the private saving device only resulted in increased savings for those married couples, who signaled a mutual absence of trust or trustworthiness among each other, according to their choices in the trust game. In contrast, couples with any higher level of spousal trust or trustworthiness in fact reported higher amounts of savings in the control group, who had received only the shared saving device.

This heterogeneity is driven by the wife's mistrust in absence of her husband's trustwor-

thiness, whereby the private saving device facilitates more effective hiding of the wife's saving amounts. The channel of hiding behaviors behind this heterogeneity in treatment effects of the private saving device is additionally supported by the finding that both, the main heterogeneity as well as the channel analysis within the treatment group, are driven (i) by this exact constellation of a mutual absence of the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness, (ii) by the sample of female participants and (iii) by less accessible saving categories, precisely bank and post office or national account savings rather than savings at home. We find evidence in favor of the husband's untrustworthiness being the triggering factor in this regard, which could act as a proxy for the willingness to involve his wife into decision making processes about money in the household.

This finding adds to the growing strand of literature suggesting that, across different countries of the Global South, wives tend to conceal substantial amounts of their savings, income or expenditures from their husband in order to keep control over how these resources are being spent. In a broader sense, our results might further lend support to the finding that hiding behaviors can induce inefficient choice outcomes, given that the hidden money of participants in this study can be considered as resources left on (or perhaps purposely under) the bargaining table.

We aim to rule out a potential alternative interpretation of the above results by showing that our findings remain robust when considering spousal control as additional heterogeneity variable. Moreover, repeating this same analysis with a placebo sample in which the trust game was played between one of the two spouses and another permanent household member suggests that the observed heterogeneity in treatment effects is indeed of a spousal nature. Quantile regressions of the main coefficients for total savings reveal that the heterogeneity in treatment effects is stronger at the tails of the distribution, and is in its magnitude driven by the highest quantile of the distribution. While this might be induced by a higher propensity to save in the first place, it might also be a consequence of a lack of access to formal saving accounts among lower percentiles of the distribution, especially for women. Thus, distributional heterogeneous effects of saving commitment devices continue to present an interesting avenue for further research.

Potential limitations of the study are a rather small sample size of 360 participants, the conduction of the trust game at endline instead of at baseline, and the inability to causally assign the hiding channel as a driver of the core heterogeneity in savings. First, despite the small sample size, the binary trust game conducted in the course of this research project is still the largest conducted trust game with spouses in a country of the Global South. Second, we deem the probability that spousal trust and trustworthiness were affected by the treatment as small, following from theoretical arguments about the measured concept of trust and from an empirical result of spousal conflict being unaffected by the treatment. Third, assigning causality to the hiding channel is by definition not possible in this study design. However, the fact that the channel results are driven by the same pattern as the core heterogeneity in treatment effects with respect to magnitude and statistical significance, the exact spousal trust dynamics, a disaggregation of total savings and a disaggregation into female and male participants yields strong supportive evidence

of the relevance of this channel.

The findings of this study are highly relevant for policy makers due to their implications for the design and evaluation of household-based saving interventions in developing countries. As undersaving continues to be a prevalent issue among the poor (Karlan et al., 2014), the importance of access to sufficient savings only further increases especially for those who are to be hit the hardest by the accelerating number of economic shocks, such as the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic or potential natural disasters induced by climate change. It is of utmost importance to ensure that the interventions and devices being distributed and introduced to the most vulnerable parts of the population in fact improve their situation effectively and are not inhibited in ways that can be foreseen.

The heterogeneity in treatment effects in terms of spousal trust and trustworthiness indicates that access-related features of saving devices can be of substantial relevance for their effectiveness in increasing savings. This varying effectiveness of different saving devices seems to be induced by the interrelations between spousal trust dynamics within the household and the prevalence of social norms that diminish the role of women in society and her influence within the household. Policy makers and researchers alike are advised to take into account such interactive effects between different features of saving interventions, spousal intra-household dynamics and the relevance of social norms in intra-household decision making for the design and evaluation of saving promotion interventions. Hence, when formulating intended welfare-improving effects of such interventions, it is crucial to take into account the sensitivity of these effects with respect to potentially inhibiting intra-household dynamics.

We believe that the policy relevance and implications outlined for saving promotion interventions might be relevant not only for saving devices, but also for a wider set of interventions or programs as long as these are household-based and intended to function despite or exactly because of assumed or neglected spousal intra-household dynamics. Examples of such interventions might be business loan disbursements in cash or cash-transfer programs, which already have been extensively examined by the literature in different ways some of which lend support to this claim. This in turn would indicate that, also in other domains, the sensitivity of an intervention's intended effects with respect to spousal intra-household dynamics and the relevance of a country's context for household decision making patterns need to be considered. Moreover, even though the core heterogeneity in total savings is indeed enabled through the private saving device, it is then realized through bank and post or national account savings. This stresses once more the importance of equal rates of financial inclusion not only between the poorer and the wealthier parts of the population, but also between women and men.

In spite of presenting meaningful insights not only for the effectiveness of household-based interventions but also for the potential theoretical significance of spousal trust in models of intra-household financial decision making, our results first and foremost motivate scope for further research in this regard. For instance, future research could focus on access-related features of household-based (saving) promotion interventions while examining other types

of (saving) devices as those in this study. In light of this, it may be also be interesting to engage in research designs that allow to assess the relative importance of access-related features as opposed to intentionally designed commitment-related characteristics. Moreover, given the growing evidence on the existence of hiding behaviors among wives in developing countries, it would be of interest for future research to causally assess whether, how and the extent to which such behaviors affect a household's financial outcomes and economic well-being. Despite the difficulties of empirically investigating household decision making dynamics to better understand their implications for designing welfare-enhancing interventions for the poor, this research emphasizes that there are indeed ways to shed light on hardly observable but important factors such as spousal trust.

References

AGGARWAL, S., BRAILOVSKAYA, V., and ROBINSON, J. (2020). *Saving for Multiple Financial Needs: Evidence from Lockboxes and Mobile Money in Malawi*. National Bureau of Economic Research.

AMBLER, K et al. (2018). "He says, she says: spousal disagreement in survey measures of bargaining power". *Economic Development and Cultural Change*.

ANDERSON, S. and BALAND, J.-M. (2002). "The economics of roscas and intrahousehold resource allocation". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 117(3), 963–995.

APPS, P. F. and REES, R. (1988). "Taxation and the Household". *Journal of Public Economics* 35(3), 355–369.

ASHRAF, N. (2009). "Spousal control and intra-household decision making: An experimental study in the Philippines". *American Economic Review* 99(4), 1245–77.

ASHRAF, N., BOHNET, I., and PIANKOV, N. (2003). "Is trust a bad investment?"

ATTANASIO, O. P. and LECHENE, V. (2014). "Efficient responses to targeted cash transfers". *Journal of political Economy* 122(1), 178–222.

ATTANASIO, O., LECHENE, V., et al. (2002). "Tests of the income pooling in household decisions". *Review of economic dynamics* 5(4), 720–748.

BALAND, J.-M., GUIRKINGER, C., and MALI, C. (2011). "Pretending to be poor: Borrowing to escape forced solidarity in Cameroon". *Economic development and cultural change* 60(1), 1–16.

BALAND, J.-M. and ZIPARO, R. (2017). "Intra-household bargaining in poor countries". *Towards Gender Equity in Development*, 69.

BANERJEE, R. (2018). "On the interpretation of World Values Survey trust question-global expectations vs. local beliefs". *European Journal of Political Economy* 55, 491–510.

BECKER, G. S. (1965). "A Theory of the Allocation of Time". *The economic journal*, 493–517.

BECKER, G. S. (1981). "Altruism in the Family and Selfishness in the Market Place". *Economica* 48(189), 1–15.

BECKER, L. C. (1996). "Trust as noncognitive security about motives". *Ethics* 107(1), 43–61.

BEN-NER, A. and HALLDORSSON, F. (2010). "Trusting and trustworthiness: What are they, how to measure them, and what affects them". *Journal of Economic Psychology* 31(1), 64–79.

BERG, J., DICKHAUT, J., and MCCABE, K. (1995). "Trust, reciprocity, and social history". *Games and economic behavior* 10(1), 122–142.

BERNHARDT, A. et al. (2019). "Household matters: Revisiting the returns to capital among female microentrepreneurs". *American Economic Review: Insights* 1(2), 141–60.

BOLTZ, M., MARAZYAN, K., and VILLAR, P. (2019). "Income hiding and informal redistribution: A lab-in-the-field experiment in Senegal". *Journal of Development Economics* 137, 78–92.

BROWNING, M. (1995). "Saving and the intra-household distribution of income: an empirical investigation". *Ricerche Economiche* 49(3), 277–292.

BROWNING, M., CHIAPPORI, P.-A., and WEISS, Y. (2014a). "Empirical Issues for the Collective Model". *Economics of the Family*. Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature. Cambridge University Press, 176–222.

BROWNING, M., CHIAPPORI, P.-A., and WEISS, Y. (2014b). "Preferences and Decision Making". *Economics of the Family*. Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature. Cambridge University Press, 80–132.

BROWNING, M. and CHIAPPORI, P.-A. (1998). "Efficient intra-household allocations: A general characterization and empirical tests". *Econometrica*, 1241–1278.

BURKS, S. V., CARPENTER, J. P., and VERHOOGEN, E. (2003). "Playing both roles in the trust game". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 51(2), 195–216.

CAMERER, C. F. (2011). *Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction*. Princeton University Press.

CARTER, M. and KATZ, E. (1997). "Separate spheres and the conjugal contract: Understanding the impact of gender-biased development". *Intrahousehold resource allocation in developing countries: Methods, models and policies*, 95–111.

CASTILLA, C. (2015). "Trust and reciprocity between spouses in India". *American Economic Review* 105(5), 621–24.

CASTILLA, C. (2019). "What's yours is mine, and what's mine is mine: Field experiment on income concealing between spouses in India". *Journal of Development Economics* 137, 125–140.

CASTILLA, C. and WALKER, T. (2013). "Is ignorance bliss? The effect of asymmetric information between spouses on intra-household allocations". *American Economic Review* 103(3), 263–68.

COLLINS, D. et al. (2009). *Portfolios of the poor: how the world's poor live on $2 a day*. Princeton University Press.

COUCH, L. L. and JONES, W. H. (1997). "Measuring levels of trust". *Journal of research in personality* 31(3), 319–336.

DEATON, A. (1989). "Saving in developing countries: Theory and review". *The World Bank Economic Review* 3, 61–96.

DEMIRGUC-KUNT, A. et al. (2018). *The Global Findex Database 2017: Measuring financial inclusion and the fintech revolution*. The World Bank.

DESAI, S. B. et al. (2010). "Human development in India". *New York: Oxford University*.

DI FALCO, S. and BULTE, E. (2011). "A dark side of social capital? Kinship, consumption, and savings". *Journal of Development Studies* 47(8), 1128–1151.

DUBOIS, P. and LIGON, E. (2011). "Incentives and nutrition for rotten kids: intrahousehold food allocation in the Philippines". CUDARE Working Papers (1557-2016-132791).

DUFLO, E. (2003). "Grandmothers and granddaughters: old-age pensions and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa". *The World Bank Economic Review* 17(1), 1–25.

ERIKSON, E. H. (1993). *Childhood and society*. WW Norton & Company.

ERMISCH, J. et al. (2009). "Measuring people's trust". *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)* 172(4), 749–769.

FAFCHAMPS, M. (2001). "Intrahousehold access to land and sources of inefficiency: Theory and concepts". *Access to land, rural poverty and public action*, 68–96.

FIALA, N. (2017). "Business is tough, but family is worse: Household bargaining and investment in microenterprises in Uganda". *University of Connecticut Department of Economics Working Paper Series* 5.

FORTIN, B. and LACROIX, G. (1997). "A test of the unitary and collective models of household labour supply". *The economic journal* 107(443), 933–955.

FREITAG, M. and TRAUNMÜLLER, R. (2009). "Spheres of trust: An empirical analysis of the foundations of particularised and generalised trust". *European Journal of Political Research* 48(6), 782–803.

GÄCHTER, S., HERRMANN, B., and THÖNI, C. (2004). "Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 55(4), 505–531.

GLAESER, E. L. et al. (2000). "Measuring trust". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115(3), 811–846.

GLANVILLE, J. L. and PAXTON, P. (2007). "How do we learn to trust? A confirmatory tetrad analysis of the sources of generalized trust". *Social Psychology Quarterly* 70(3), 230–242.

GLENNERSTER, R., WALSH, C., and DIAZ-MARTIN, L. (2018). "A practical guide to measuring women's and girls' empowerment in impact evaluations". *Gender Sector, Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab*.

GOLDBERG, J. (2017). "The effect of social pressure on expenditures in Malawi". *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 143, 173–185.

GROSSMAN, P. J., ZHAN, W., and ECKEL, C. C. (2020). *Does How We Measure Altruism Matter? Playing Both Roles in Dictator Games*. Monash University.

HARDIN, R. (2002). *Trust and trustworthiness*. Russell Sage Foundation.

HOEL, J. B. (2015). "Heterogeneous households: A within-subject test of asymmetric information between spouses in Kenya". *Journal of economic behavior & organization* 118, 123–135.

HULME, D., MOORE, K., and BARRIENTOS, A. (2015). "Assessing the insurance role of microsavings". *Financing for Overcoming Economic Insecurity*. Ed. by. M. K. R. VOS N. Islam. Bloomsbury Publishing.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR POPULATION SCIENCES (2018). *National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), India, 2015-16: Maharashtra*. Tech. rep.

IVERSEN, V. et al. (2011). "Do spouses realise cooperative gains? Experimental evidence from rural Uganda". *World Development* 39(4), 569–578.

JAKIELA, P. and OZIER, O. (2016). "Does Africa need a rotten kin theorem? Experimental evidence from village economies". *The Review of Economic Studies* 83(1), 231–268.

JOHNSON, N. D. and MISLIN, A. (2012). "How much should we trust the World Values Survey trust question?" *Economics Letters* 116(2), 210–212.

JONES, K. (1996). "Trust as an affective attitude". *Ethics* 107(1), 4–25.

KARLAN, D., RATAN, A. L., and ZINMAN, J. (2014). "Savings by and for the Poor: A Research Review and Agenda". *Review of Income and Wealth* 60(1), 36–78.

KEBEDE, B. et al. (2014). "Intra-household efficiency: An experimental study from Ethiopia". *Journal of African Economies* 23(1), 105–150.

LEVENSON, H. (1973). "Reliability and Validity of the I, P, and C Scales-A Multidimensional View of Locus of Control."

LOWN, J. M. (2011). "Development and validation of a financial self-efficacy scale". *Journal of Financial Counseling and Planning* 22(2), 54.

LUNDBERG, S. J., POLLAK, R. A., and WALES, T. J. (1997). "Do husbands and wives pool their resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom child benefit". *Journal of Human resources*, 463–480.

MACY, M. W. and SATO, Y. (2002). "Trust, cooperation, and market formation in the US and Japan". *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 99(suppl 3), 7214–7220.

MANI, A. (2020). "Mine, yours or ours? The efficiency of household investment decisions: An experimental approach". *The World Bank Economic Review* 34(3), 575–596.

MANSER, M. and BROWN, M. (1980). "Marriage and household decision-making: A bargaining analysis". *International economic review*, 31–44.

MAYOUX, L. and ANAND, S. (1995). "Gender inequality, roscas and sectoral employment strategies: questions from the south indian silk industry". *Money-go-rounds: The Importance of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations for Women (Washington, DC: BERG, 1995)*, 179–196.

MAZZOCCO, M. (2007). "Household intertemporal behaviour: A collective characterization and a test of commitment". *The Review of Economic Studies* 74(3), 857–895.

MCELROY, M. B. and HORNEY, M. J. (1981). "Nash-bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand". *International economic review*, 333–349.

MUNRO, A. et al. (2014). "Autonomy and efficiency. An experiment on household decisions in two regions of India". *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 33, 114–133.

OFFE, C. (1999). "How can we trust our fellow citizens". *Democracy and trust* 52, 42–87.

PAXTON, P. and GLANVILLE, J. L. (2015). "Is trust rigid or malleable? A laboratory experiment". *Social Psychology Quarterly* 78(2), 194–204.

RILEY, E. (2018). "Hiding loans in the household using mobile money: Experimental evidence on microenterprise investment in Uganda".

ROTTER, J. B. (1971). "Generalized expectancies for interpersonal trust." *American psychologist* 26(5), 443.

RUTHERFORD, S. (2009). *The poor and their money: microfinance from a twenty-first century consumer's perspective*. Practical Action Publishing.

SAMUELSON, P. A. (1956). "Social indifference curves". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 70(1), 1–22.

SCHANER, S. (2015). "Do opposites detract? Intrahousehold preference heterogeneity and inefficient strategic savings". *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 7(2), 135–74.

SCHANER, S. (2017). "The cost of convenience? Transaction costs, bargaining power, and savings account use in Kenya". *Journal of Human Resources* 52(4), 919–945.

SOMAN, D. and CHEEMA, A. (2011). "Earmarking and partitioning: Increasing saving by low-income households". *Journal of Marketing Research* 48(SPL), S14–S22.

STEINERT, J. I. et al. (2018). "Household economic strengthening through financial and psychosocial programming: Evidence from a field experiment in South Africa". *Journal of Development Economics* 134, 443–466.

STEINERT, J. I. et al. (2020). *Commitment or concealment? Impacts and use of a portable saving device: Evidence from a field experiment in urban India*. CRC Discussion Papers, Courant Research Centre Poverty, Equity and Growth, Universität Göttingen.

STRAUSS, J., MWABU, G., and BEEGLE, K. (2000). "Intrahousehold allocations: a review of theories and empirical evidence". *Journal of African Economies* 9, 83–143.

THOMAS, D. (1990). "Intra-household resource allocation: An inferential approach". *Journal of human resources*, 635–664.

UNDP (2019). *Human Development Report 2019. Beyond income, beyond averages, beyond today: Inequalities in human development in the 21st century*. Tech. rep.

UDRY, C. (1996). "Gender, agricultural production, and the theory of the household". *Journal of political Economy* 104(5), 1010–1046.

USLANER, E. M. (1999). "Democracy and social capital". *Democracy and trust*, 121–150.

USLANER, E. M. (2002). *The moral foundations of trust*. Cambridge University Press.

VAN LANGE, P. A., VINKHUYZEN, A. A., and POSTHUMA, D. (2014). "Genetic influences are virtually absent for trust". *PloS one* 9(4), e93880.

VERSCHOOR, A. et al. (2019). "Spousal Control and Efficiency of Intra-household Decision-Making: Experiments among Married Couples in India, Ethiopia and Nigeria". *The European Journal of Development Research* 31(4), 1171–1196.

WORLD BANK (2017a). *Maharashtra - Gender. India state briefs*. Tech. rep.

WORLD BANK (2017b). *Maharashtra - Poverty, growth, and inequality. India state briefs*. Tech. rep.

YOSANO, A. and HAYASHI, N. (2005). "Social stratification, intermediary groups and creation of trustfulness". *Sociological Theory and Methods* 20(1), 27–44.

Appendix

TABLE A1: Description of survey items and constructed variables

Survey item/Variable	Description	Sample
Participant sex	Female, Male	Full sample
Participant age	Age in years	Full sample
Education	None, primary, secondary, tertiary	Full sample
Caste	Scheduled caste/tribe, backward caste or tribe, other caste, open	Full sample
Religion	Hindu, Islam, Christian, Sikh, Jainism, Buddhism, Zororastrian, other	Full sample
Employed	Employed (any occupation), unemployed	Full sample
Household size	Number of household members	Full sample
Household income	Sums past-month income from loans, rent, interest, assets, lifestock, land, charity, government, religious groups, remittances	Full sample
Household expenditures	Sums past-month expenditures on list of food items and non-food items, (non-food items: tax, gas, worship, soap, book, insurance, repairs)	Full sample
Outstanding debt	Amount of outstanding loans	Full sample
Resilience	Index from not having money for the hospital/pharmacy/emergency	Full sample
Post savings	Savings in post offices/national savings centres	Full sample
Bank account savings	Savings in bank savings account	Full sample
Savings at home	Cash savings at home	Full sample
Savings with relatives	Cash savings with relatives	Full sample
Mobile savings	Savings in mobile phone money account	Full sample
Savings club savings	Savings in savings club/association	Full sample
Box savings	Savings in metal lockbox (counted)	Full sample
Purse savings	Savings in zip-purse (counted)	Full sample
Total savings	Sums all of the above saving categories	Full sample
Total number of assets	Sums number of household-based assets out of 25 assets	Full sample
Number of housing assets	Sums number of housing condition assets out of 16 assets	Full sample
Total temptation expenditures	Total difference in desired future consumption and self-reported past-month consumption of temptation goods	Full sample
Female empowerment	Index based on two items by Glennerster et al. (2018) (freedom to leave house unannounced and making unescorted outings)	Female sample only
Female financial decision making	Sum of three items regarding extent and nature of husband's decision making power	Female sample only
Gender attitudes	Index based on five items by Glennerster et al. (2018) (extent of agreement with gender-related statements)	Full sample
Self-efficacy	Index of five items by Levenson (1973), Lown (2011), Steinert et al. (2018) (extent of agreement with statements eliciting self-efficacy)	Full sample

FIGURE A1: Treatment: Private portable saving device (Zip purse)

FIGURE A2: Active control: Shared stationary saving device (Metal Lockbox)

TABLE A2: Overview trust variables

Variable	Description		
	Regardless of role in trust game (N = 360)	First mover is wife (N = 214)	First mover is husband (N= 146)
Husband TTw	1 = Husband trusts/is trustworthy; 0 = Husband does not trust/is not trustworthy	1 = Husband is trustworthy; 0 = Husband is not trustworthy	1 = Husband trusts; 0 = Husband does not trust
Wife TTw	1 = Wife trusts/is trustworthy; 0 = Wife does not trust/is not trustworthy	1 = Wife trusts; 0 = Wife does not trust	1 = Wife is trustworthy; 0 = Wife is not trustworthy
Mutual TTw	1 = Husband and wife trust/are trustworthy; 0 = all else	1 = Wife trusts, husband is trustworthy; 0 = all else	1 = Wife is trustworthy, husband trusts; 0 = all else
No TTw	1 = Husband and wife do not trust/are not trustworthy; 0 = all else	1 = Wife does not trust, husband is not trustworthy; 0 = all else	1 = Wife is not trustworthy, husband does not trust; 0 = all else
TTw Index	0 = (No TTw= 1) 1 = (Wife TTw = 0 and Husband TTw = 1) 2 = (Wife TTw = 1 and Husband TTw = 0) 3 = (Mutual TTw = 1)	0 = (No TTw= 1) 1 = (Wife TTw = 0 and Husband TTw = 1) 2 = (Wife TTw = 1 and Husband TTw = 0), 3 = (Mutual TTw = 1)	0 = (No TTw= 1) 1 = (Wife TTw = 0 and Husband TTw = 1) 2 = (Wife TTw = 1 and Husband TTw = 0) 3 = (Mutual TTw = 1)

FIGURE A3: Gender-specific trust game payouts

TABLE A3: Trust game results

Variable	Regardless of FM in trust game	Wife FM (1)	Husband FM (2)	T-test Diff. (1)-(2)
Husband TTw (a)	0.60	0.59	0.62	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Wife TTw (b)	0.53	0.47	0.62	-0.15***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
T-test Diff. (a)-(b)	0.07*	0.12**	(0.00)	
	(0.037)	(0.05)	(0.00)	
Mutual TTw (c)	0.32	0.29	0.38	-0.09*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
No TTw (d)	0.19	0.22	0.14	0.08*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
T-test Diff, (c)-(d)	0.13***	0.07	0.23***	
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	
TTw Index	1.66	1.54	1.85	-0.31***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.12)
Observations	360	214	146	

Notes: Reported are mean values and standard errors in parentheses of the indicator variables *Husband TTw*, *Wife TTw*, *Mutual TTw*, *No TTw* as well as of the categorical variable *TTw Index*. *TTw Index* captures the different trust and trustworthiness combinations between spouses (0 = Both did not indicate trust or trustworthiness; 1 = Husband indicated trust or trustworthiness, wife did not; 2 = Wife indicated trust or trustworthiness; husband did not; 3 = Both indicated trust or trustworthiness).

TABLE A4: Baseline characteristics and orthogonality verification

Variable	Overall (N=360)	(1) Control (N=178)	(2) Treatment (N=182)	T-test Difference (1)-(2)
Female	0.839	0.843	0.835	0.008
	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.028)	
Age	34.742	34.949	34.538	0.411
	(0.605)	(0.846)	(0.867)	
Belongs to scheduled/backward caste or tribe	0.539	0.528	0.549	-0.021
	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.037)	
Hindu	0.761	0.781	0.742	0.039
	(0.023)	(0.031)	(0.033)	
Household members	4.111	4.067	4.154	-0.086
	(0.097)	(0.150)	(0.123)	
Unemployed	0.350	0.348	0.352	-0.003
	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.035)	
No education	0.206	0.208	0.203	0.005
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.030)	
Completed primary education	0.208	0.225	0.192	0.032
	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.029)	
Completed secondary education	0.403	0.376	0.429	-0.052
	(0.026)	(0.036)	(0.037)	
Completed tertiary education	0.183	0.191	0.176	0.015
	(0.020)	(0.030)	(0.028)	
Past-month income	9800.262	9767.427	9832.374	-64.947
	(539.828)	(726.667)	(733.997)	
Total savings balance	4913.833	5317.938	4518.610	799.328
	(402.211)	(590.877)	(546.825)	
Bank account savings balance	3006.208	3419.944	2601.566	818.378
	(323.813)	(502.882)	(409.485)	
National account savings balance	150.092	158.612	141.758	16.854
	(42.005)	(62.479)	(56.463)	
Savings balance at home	757.778	676.124	837.637	-161.514
	(70.483)	(93.951)	(104.771)	
Savings balance with relatives	298.889	339.888	258.791	81.096
	(81.560)	(127.440)	(102.696)	
Past-month temptation spending	144.767	147.354	142.236	5.118
	(14.695)	(20.719)	(20.894)	
Female empowerment index	0.168	0.201	0.136	0.065
	(0.080)	(0.097)	(0.093)	
Self-efficacy index	6.128	6.112	6.143	-0.032
	(0.137)	(0.193)	(0.194)	
Outstanding debt	7637.075	9517.680	5797.802	3719.878
	(1738.743)	(2706.274)	(2195.097)	
Past-month household expenditures	4228.939	4148.303	4307.802	-159.499
	(197.428)	(258.552)	(298.188)	
Resilience index	0.312	0.317	0.308	0.010
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.031)	
Number of total assets	9.739	9.781	9.698	0.083
	(0.131)	(0.171)	(0.198)	
Number of housing condition assets	7.419	7.466	7.374	0.093
	(0.103)	(0.134)	(0.157)	
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)			0.381	
F-test, number of observations			360	

Notes: Means and standard errors (in parentheses) displayed for the full sample, treatment and control group. All missing values in balance variables are replaced with the mean value of this variable. ***, **, and * would indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

TABLE A5: Total savings (female subsample only):
Heterogeneity by mutual absence and presence of trust and trustworthiness

Dependent variable: Total savings balance									
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	-811.72	-749.68	-2404.92*	-1990.69	-3110.75	-796.68	-1165.70	-372.89	-1532.07
	(1157.85)	(1209.46)	(1299.62)	(1564.31)	(2406.05)	(1162.61)	(1432.60)	(1788.35)	(3244.90)
No TTw		931.90	-2852.18*	-2902.48	-4894.21				
		(1625.62)	(1559.95)	(1860.22)	(3084.95)				
Treatment × No TTw			8737.20**	9265.79*	9543.31				
			(3679.45)	(4917.53)	(7226.26)				
Mutual TTw						305.26	-266.61	-1250.62	2106.65
						(1260.72)	(1775.40)	(1634.48)	(3272.88)
Treatment × Mutual TTw							1183.52	966.25	1298.26
							(2443.57)	(2589.66)	(4637.31)
Lagged Outcome	0.27	0.27	0.26	0.19	0.38	0.27	0.27	0.20	0.37
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.43)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.42)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.15	0.15	0.18	0.23	0.13	0.15	0.15	0.20	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.13	0.12	0.15	0.18	0.03	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.02
Observations	284	284	284	184	100	284	284	184	100
Mean Control	7497.61	7497.61	7497.61	7391.55	7756.29	7497.61	7497.61	7391.55	7756.29
	(952.05)	(952.05)	(952.05)	(1083.23)	(1955.60)	(952.05)	(952.05)	(1083.23)	(1955.60)

Notes: The estimation only employ the subsample of female participants. Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A6: Total savings (female subsample only):
Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-811.72	-592.97	6222.50*	6998.05	5881.81
	(1157.85)	(1211.11)	(3368.71)	(4606.34)	(7270.76)
TTw index = 1		-118.85	5943.80**	6532.17**	5201.26
		(1939.08)	(2672.86)	(3058.23)	(4516.33)
TTw index = 2		-2906.05*	-915.28	-1353.37	564.32
		(1723.75)	(1430.77)	(1578.85)	(3486.69)
TTw index = 3		-586.82	2034.85	987.51	5084.63
		(1805.86)	(1761.74)	(1691.51)	(3360.75)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			-12837.60***	-13908.59**	-11217.18
			(4450.05)	(5658.56)	(8728.04)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			-5364.20	-4305.24	-5972.69
			(3591.80)	(5030.09)	(7271.31)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			-6342.67	-6524.52	-6221.55
			(3937.92)	(5041.20)	(8228.30)
Lagged outcome	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.20	0.32
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.41)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.15	0.16	0.20	0.27	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.21	0.01
Observations	284	284	284	184	100
Mean Control	7497.61	7497.61	7497.61	7391.55	7756.29
	(952.05)	(952.05)	(952.05)	(1083.23)	(1955.60)

Notes: The regressions only employ the subsample of female participants. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A7: Bank account savings:
Heterogeneity by mutual absence and presence of trust and trustworthiness

Dependent variable: Bank account savings balance									
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	-549.18	-533.07	-1588.43*	-1684.33	-1177.72	-589.52	-783.32	-104.82	-372.67
	(885.81)	(890.96)	(953.51)	(1255.90)	(1516.27)	(885.07)	(1141.80)	(1488.34)	(1600.37)
No TTw		1556.83	-1095.15	-2214.99	-64.79				
		(1287.16)	(1188.91)	(1471.93)	(2836.67)				
Treatment × No TTw			5467.42**	8509.45**	1972.56				
			(2730.81)	(3830.91)	(4410.00)				
Mutual TTw						-548.22	-836.01	-808.44	1121.68
						(870.77)	(1303.22)	(1268.77)	(1934.32)
Treatment × Mutual TTw							598.07	495.13	-451.56
							(1685.57)	(1840.18)	(2427.79)
Lagged outcome	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.29	0.10	0.22	0.22	0.31	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.18)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.14	0.14	0.16	0.24	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.20	0.10
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.19	0.02	0.11	0.11	0.15	0.02
Observations	344	344	344	203	141	344	344	203	141
Mean control	4057.06	4057.06	4057.06	4070	4033.33	4057.06	4057.06	4070	4033.33
	(695.03)	(695.03)	(695.03)	(861.58)	(1185.83)	(695.03)	(695.03)	(861.58)	(1185.83)

Notes: Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A8: Bank account savings:
Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Bank account savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-549.18	-529.59	3782.92	6479.03*	773.44
	(885.81)	(904.43)	(2507.75)	(3536.89)	(4137.70)
TTw index = 1		-640.99	3101.95	5329.34*	-2153.71
		(1549.49)	(2111.60)	(2735.48)	(2808.51)
TTw index = 2		-2709.53*	-388.10	-1360.58	978.52
		(1411.04)	(1510.91)	(1247.21)	(4401.36)
TTw index = 3		-1643.26	350.09	956.13	438.63
		(1363.00)	(1306.12)	(1265.77)	(2892.44)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			-7362.55**	-12249.59***	572.40
			(3396.55)	(4650.15)	(4803.46)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			-4737.42*	-4864.79	-4105.67
			(2788.68)	(3708.82)	(5662.06)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			-4067.20	-6210.07*	-1704.54
			(2844.90)	(3736.20)	(4575.55)
Lagged outcome	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.29*	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.14	0.15	0.17	0.27	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.21	0.01
Observations	344	344	344	203	141
Mean control	4057.06	4057.06	4057.06	4070	4033.33
	(695.03)	(695.03)	(695.03)	(861.58)	(1185.83)

Notes: Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A9: Post/National account savings:
Heterogeneity by mutual absence and presence of trust and trustworthiness

Dependent variable: Post/national account savings balance									
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	492.81**	494.89**	417.44*	509.43	378.10*	498.60**	434.91	888.25*	87.44
	(212.45)	(212.24)	(215.90)	(338.07)	(213.05)	(219.78)	(272.62)	(457.07)	(168.14)
No TTw		189.99	-6.95	-138.59	137.26				
		(338.23)	(387.59)	(486.52)	(197.09)				
Treatment × No TTw			402.23	928.56	-106.86				
			(641.16)	(988.54)	(357.65)				
Mutual TTw						80.54	-14.14	179.25	28.26
						(239.71)	(194.06)	(309.63)	(116.83)
Treatment × Mutual TTw							196.95	-686.82	1117.44
							(528.31)	(711.37)	(772.69)
Lagged outcome	0.37	0.35	0.35	0.37	0.17	0.37	0.36	0.38	0.18
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.13)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.04
Observations	344	344	344	203	141	344	344	203	141
Mean control	178.24	178.24	178.24	275.46	0	178.24	178.24	275.46	0
	(105.32)	(105.32)	(105.32)	(162.28)	(-)	(105.32)	(105.32)	(162.28)	(-)

Notes: Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A10: Post/National account savings:
Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Post/national account savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	492.81**	506.56**	807.05	1424.07	234.18
	(212.45)	(219.99)	(613.66)	(962.87)	(342.58)
TTw index = 1		-270.49	134.45	262.34	-236.68
		(385.15)	(480.09)	(629.34)	(238.36)
TTw index = 2		-236.70	-164.46	-223.60	-155.20
		(379.70)	(374.59)	(455.42)	(293.05)
TTw index = 3		-100.80	-2.51	240.07	-139.92
		(367.53)	(389.21)	(506.58)	(193.50)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			-763.96	-1288.86	-141.79
			(683.11)	(1048.95)	(315.92)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			-157.57	216.42	-289.37
			(702.94)	(1239.34)	(328.16)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			-184.25	-1244.31	960.12
			(765.27)	(1126.57)	(797.83)
Lagged outcome	0.37	0.34	0.35	0.38	0.13
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.16)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Observations	344	344	344	203	141
Mean control	178.24	178.24	178.24	275.46	0
	(105.32)	(105.32)	(105.32)	(162.28)	(-)

Notes: Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A11: Savings at home:
Heterogeneity by mutual absence and presence of trust and trustworthiness

Dependent variable: Savings balance at home									
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	-73.80	-74.21	-20.42	-27.16	-56.03	-61.21	-230.45	-302.66	-184.48
	(135.00)	(135.01)	(157.55)	(200.31)	(273.00)	(137.63)	(151.37)	(208.10)	(244.75)
No TTw		-76.05	62.96	130.25	98.98				
		(149.87)	(244.53)	(288.23)	(408.38)				
Treatment × No TTw			-283.75	-260.22	-375.82				
			(314.92)	(413.29)	(486.61)				
Mutual TTw						173.40	-76.51	-465.78**	143.61
						(153.79)	(205.76)	(217.19)	(333.38)
Treatment × Mutual TTw							519.96	772.82*	390.32
							(332.98)	(393.42)	(539.73)
Lagged outcome	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.16*	0.23*	0.20***	0.20***	0.16	0.23*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.11
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.03
Observations	344	344	344	203	141	344	344	203	141
Mean control	588.82	588.82	588.82	547.27	665	588.82	588.82	547.27	665
	(99.83)	(99.83)	(99.83)	(117.83)	(183.60)	(99.83)	(99.83)	(117.83)	(183.60)

Notes: Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A12: Savings at home:
Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Savings balance at home					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	-73.80	-61.15	-308.01	-315.22	-444.02
	(135.00)	(137.50)	(268.36)	(374.18)	(373.52)
TTw index = 1		19.37	-8.94	45.64	-90.61
		(179.41)	(292.25)	(326.71)	(543.40)
TTw index = 2		-17.80	-63.92	18.32	-402.09
		(176.16)	(314.09)	(402.28)	(486.28)
TTw index = 3		175.58	-100.87	-445.25	-51.91
		(188.59)	(280.36)	(323.58)	(448.14)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			90.13	-92.45	423.53
			(361.59)	(429.88)	(670.24)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			127.14	196.05	293.63
			(377.53)	(548.68)	(525.35)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			598.85	785.15	659.49
			(418.72)	(528.66)	(638.12)
Lagged outcome	0.20***	0.20***	0.20***	0.16	0.25*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.11	0.12
Adj. R^2	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.01
Observations	344	344	344	203	141
Mean control	588.82	588.82	588.82	547.27	665
	(99.83)	(99.83)	(99.83)	(117.83)	(183.60)

Notes: Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A13: Hiding effectiveness channel: Disaggregated savings balances

PANEL A: Savings in post offices and national savings centres					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hiding	236.89	176.22	-279.27	-1028.40	476.68
	(473.79)	(435.66)	(478.74)	(780.77)	(1089.44)
No TTw		670.63	-556.72	-441.84	-807.27
		(722.70)	(524.87)	(452.90)	(866.83)
No TTw × Hiding			2634.58**	3901.23**	349.53
			(1181.83)	(1542.37)	(1384.92)
Lagged outcome	0.68	0.66	0.74	0.98	0.45**
	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.56)	(0.71)	(0.20)
R^2	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.26	0.09
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.15	-0.10
PANEL B: Bank account savings					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hiding	328.43	142.26	-1175.36	-2570.07*	1742.49
	(1265.42)	(1144.64)	(1080.41)	(1503.13)	(1775.66)
No TTw		2060.26	-1475.79	-1309.57	-740.26
		(2220.04)	(1059.50)	(1714.53)	(1704.76)
No TTw × Hiding			7623.96	12121.05	-2650.33
			(4738.82)	(7504.10)	(2363.76)
Lagged outcome	0.14	0.13	0.18	0.39	0.05
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.25)	(0.14)
R^2	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.30	0.26
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.18	0.10
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	144	144	144	81	63

Notes: Estimation employs only observations from within the treatment group and only those where the spouse did not have access to the portable savings device, as indicated by participants. Hiding is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the purse helps her to keep money to herself and not to give it to other people. Columns 4 and 5 in both panels restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). All regressions include the stratification variable baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A14: Hiding effectiveness channel: Savings at home

Dependent variable: Savings at home					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Hiding	-50.03	-27.07	-54.45	51.87	-306.00
	(210.27)	(206.82)	(240.24)	(310.19)	(368.74)
No TTw		-256.76	-329.39	-567.39	-375.55
		(245.91)	(309.77)	(561.93)	(630.77)
No TTw × Hiding			157.88	610.22	-80.67
			(438.61)	(756.20)	(696.02)
Lagged outcome	0.19*	0.19*	0.19*	0.05	0.41**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.20
Adj. R^2	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.04	0.03
Observations	144	144	144	81	63

Notes: Estimation employs only observations from within the treatment group and only those where the spouse did not have access to the portable savings device, as indicated by participants. Hiding is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the purse helps her to keep money to herself and not to give it to other people. Columns 4, 5, 9 and 10 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 9 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 10). All regressions include the stratification variable baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A15: Hiding channel - Measurement of hiding behaviour

Dependent variable:	Total Savings			Post/National Savings			Bank Account Savings		
FM in trust game:	W/H	W/H	W	W/H	W/H	W	W/H	W/H	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Hidingscale	318.06	-273.90	-518.10	103.08	-54.14	-189.25	293.54	-154.23	-458.71
	(545.17)	(575.45)	(784.30)	(166.63)	(188.75)	(213.55)	(378.71)	(360.72)	(526.01)
No TTw	2440.94	-9496.08*	-10074.61	671.26	-2462.02*	-2269.44**	2004.29	-6821.72*	-8294.92
	(2919.77)	(5359.21)	(6385.97)	(737.06)	(1277.71)	(1026.54)	(2251.75)	(3903.62)	(5207.05)
No TTw × Hidingscale		3842.11*	5153.28*		1005.42**	1183.38**		2841.78*	4107.73*
		(2144.50)	(2867.34)		(453.01)	(479.61)		(1677.46)	(2378.90)
Lagged outcome	0.17	0.23	0.41	0.66	0.80	0.97	0.13	0.19	0.39
	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.58)	(0.56)	(0.74)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.25)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.10	0.14	0.25	0.09	0.12	0.23	0.13	0.16	0.27
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.06	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.15
Observations	144	144	81	144	144	81	144	144	81

Notes: Estimation employs only observations from within the treatment arm and only those where the spouse did not have access to the portable savings device, as indicated by participants. Estimation uses the originally measured categorical variable Hidingscale, which captures the participant's degree of agreement towards the statement that the purse helps her to keep money to herself and not to give it to other people (1= strong agreement, 5 = strong disagreement; multiplied by -1). Columns 3, 6 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with the wife (W) as the first mover (FM), i.e. the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured. All regressions include the stratification variable baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A16: Hiding channel - No restriction on husband's purse access

Dependent variable:	Total Savings			Post/National Savings			Bank Account Savings		
FM in trust game:	W/H	W/H	W	W/H	W/H	W	W/H	W/H	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Hiding	554.83	-1063.51	-2800.24	377.37	-32.57	-460.73	440.78	-530.74	-2809.49*
	(1520.72)	(1490.56)	(2072.76)	(427.24)	(463.77)	(776.29)	(1190.70)	(1080.90)	(1522.89)
No TTw	2119.91	-2190.72	-287.54	499.26	-574.03	-733.82	2317.66	-199.49	1319.53
	(2896.05)	(2170.38)	(3152.27)	(650.60)	(504.85)	(647.47)	(2415.82)	(2148.41)	(3071.70)
No TTw × Hiding		9897.94	15107.25		2454.09**	3689.75**		5827.61	9989.33
		(6107.73)	(9542.78)		(1196.79)	(1617.90)		(4934.51)	(7853.94)
Lagged outcome	0.45	0.49*	0.73***	0.51	0.60	0.59	0.34	0.37	0.69**
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.59)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.32)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.17	0.20	0.39	0.08	0.11	0.19	0.18	0.20	0.39
Adj. R^2	0.11	0.14	0.31	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.30
Observations	159	159	87	159	159	87	159	159	87

Notes: Estimation employs only observations from within the treatment arm, regardless of whether the other spouse has access to the portable savings device, as indicated by the participants. Hiding is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the participant agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that the purse helps her to keep money to herself and not to give it to other people. Columns 3, 6 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with the wife (W) as the first mover (FM), i.e. the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured. All regressions include the stratification variable baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A17: Treatment effects on spousal conflict about money

Dependent variable: Spousal conflict about money				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment	-0.05	-0.08	-0.10	-0.09
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Fsalary				0.02
				(0.06)
Female empowerment				-0.19
				(0.14)
Gender attitudes				-0.02
				(0.03)
Female financial decision making				-0.00
				(0.15)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓
Lagged outcome		0.23***	0.19***	0.17**
		(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Controls			✓	✓
R^2	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.09
Adj. R^2	-0.00	0.06	0.05	0.04
Observations	299	299	283	276
Mean control	1.70	1.70	1.71	1.73
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)

Notes: Only female participants are considered since information on conflict within the household was only collected for female participants. Spousal conflict about money is a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 5 and capturing the frequency of conflict about money between the participant and her husband based on the statement 'When it comes to money, how often is there conflict between you and your partner?' (1: Never, 5: Very often). Stratification variables contain participant's baseline savings quintile and controls are the participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Fsalary corresponds to the number of female household members earning a salary, lagged female empowerment to the baseline value of the female empowerment index, lagged gender attitudes to the lagged value of the gender attitude index and lagged female decision making to the baseline value of the indicator variable capturing participant's agreement with the statement 'Are you involved in decisions about money in your home?' (0: No, 1: Yes). Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A18: CACE estimates total savings:
Heterogeneity by mutual absence and presence of trust and trustworthiness

CACE Estimates (Purse usage = trialarm)									
Dependent variable: Total savings balance									
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Used purse	-946.24	-922.47	-3072.51	-3181.57	-3027.16	-902.85	-2025.30	-250.83	-2592.56
	(1861.67)	(1868.86)	(2072.43)	(2517.41)	(3551.08)	(1861.29)	(2409.21)	(2962.08)	(4258.96)
No TTw		1305.68	-1654.89	-2519.54	-379.76				
		(1478.28)	(1454.09)	(1720.55)	(2884.17)				
Used purse × No TTw			10755.08*	15113.30**	4219.05				
			(5499.60)	(6670.30)	(9219.34)				
Mutual TTw						390.19	-534.82	-884.22	1597.00
						(1080.03)	(1508.75)	(1487.95)	(2615.92)
Used purse × Mutual TTw							3200.68	1604.14	3481.02
							(3662.42)	(3867.48)	(6238.91)
Lagged Outcome	0.37**	0.37**	0.36**	0.37**	0.28	0.37**	0.37**	0.40**	0.27
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.30)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.29)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.27	0.11	0.17	0.17	0.22	0.15
Adj. R^2	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.22	0.03	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.07
First Stage:									
F-Statistic	225.88	225.44	112.42	60.99	41.98	227.35	113.50	60.62	39.63
			22.57	15.67	8.14		40.88	26.69	15.03
Sanderson-Windmeijer χ^2	232.76	233.02	184.16	101.71	75.54	234.99	152.52	86.13	57.86
			215.64	130.19	54.01		224.97	144.09	83.35
Observations	338	338	338	202	136	338	338	202	136
Mean control	7240.53	7240.53	7240.53	6946.68	7807.61	7240.53	7240.53	6946.68	7807.61
	(855.24)	(855.24)	(855.24)	(1003.21)	(1601.04)	(855.24)	(855.24)	(1003.21)	(1601.04)

Notes: The table reports CACE estimates with self-reported usage of the purse instrumented by the treatment dummy. When multiple first stage statistics are reported, the first one is from the first-stage regression with Purse usage as the dependent variable and the second one from the first-stage with Purse usage *times* the corresponding trust indicator as the dependent variable. Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A19: CACE estimates total savings:
Heterogeneity by trust and trustworthiness index

CACE Estimates (Purse usage = trialarm)					
Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Used purse	-946.24	-774.42	7532.64	11521.37*	913.72
	(1861.67)	(1881.31)	(4910.18)	(5937.70)	(8401.39)
TTw index = 1		-616.41	4402.58*	6345.78**	-442.46
		(1722.45)	(2409.80)	(2931.59)	(3549.35)
TTw index = 2		-3115.18*	-1325.24	-2060.82	-871.00
		(1639.93)	(1673.58)	(1569.03)	(4189.99)
TTw index = 3		-813.98	935.41	990.96	1083.38
		(1617.27)	(1597.41)	(1594.81)	(3050.52)
Used purse × TTw index = 1			-20427.99**	-27523.02***	-4273.82
			(7970.19)	(9294.79)	(12418.62)
Used purse × TTw index = 2			-7330.56	-6899.06	-4923.09
			(5388.39)	(6791.72)	(10051.89)
Used purse × TTw index = 3			-6666.75	-10420.49	-297.47
			(5697.15)	(6550.55)	(9698.32)
Lagged Outcome	0.37**	0.37**	0.35**	0.37**	0.28
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.29)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.26	0.14
Adj. R^2	0.14	0.15	0.13	0.21	0.03
First Stage:					
F-Statistic	225.88	228.20	59.46	31.43	19.92
			9.35	6.71	2.64
			20.95	7.81	11.13
			22.34	15.87	7.26
Sanderson-Windmeijer χ^2	232.76	237.32	51.26	34.47	18.81
			81.83	57.40	28.12
			122.13	73.19	46.50
			135.98	95.74	42.21
Observations	338	338	338	202	136
Mean control	7240.53	7240.53	7240.53	6946.68	7807.61
	(855.24)	(855.24)	(855.24)	(1003.21)	(1601.04)

Notes: The table reports CACE estimates with self-reported usage of the purse instrumented by the treatment dummy. When multiple first stage statistics are reported, the first one is from the first-stage regression with Purse usage as the dependent variable and the second, third and fourth ones from the first-stage with Purse usage *times* the corresponding category of TTw index as the dependent variable. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Column 4 employs the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category being No TTw = 1, i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover (1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw). All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A20: Spousal control as alternative heterogeneity variable

PANEL A: Spousal control proxy: Financial decisions								
Dependent variable: Total savings balance								
FM in trust game:	W/H	W/H	W/H	W/H	W	W	W	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-2404.92*	-2370.51*	-1189.21	-2824.98*	-1990.69	-2036.99	-168.44	-2145.48
	(1299.62)	(1290.08)	(1468.21)	(1487.13)	(1564.31)	(1559.41)	(1876.90)	(1823.82)
No TTw	-2852.18*	-2817.84*	919.08	-2791.36*	-2902.48	-3031.36	266.41	-3034.94
	(1559.95)	(1562.90)	(1616.80)	(1571.74)	(1860.22)	(1875.72)	(2006.42)	(1887.61)
Treatment × No TTw	8737.20**	8560.97**		8573.66**	9265.79*	9174.35*		9199.85*
	(3679.45)	(3643.66)		(3664.42)	(4917.53)	(4891.94)		(4883.54)
Spousal financial control		-2678.68**	-3752.31**	-3649.68**		-2763.47*	-2825.35	-2963.24
		(1168.92)	(1580.13)	(1596.41)		(1456.13)	(1860.24)	(1885.18)
Treatment × Spousal financial control			1856.47	1904.74			-31.46	458.43
			(2248.61)	(2272.45)			(3002.19)	(2961.50)
Lagged outcome	0.26	0.28	0.29*	0.29	0.19	0.21	0.23	0.21
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
R^2	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.23	0.24	0.21	0.24
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.15	0.18	0.19	0.16	0.19
Observations	284	284	284	284	184	184	184	184
PANEL B: Spousal control proxy: Leaving the house without informing husband								
Dependent variable: Total savings balance								
FM in trust game:	W/H	W/H	W/H	W/H	W	W	W	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treatment	-2404.92*	-2474.20*	-1553.95	-3104.50*	-1990.69	-2048.10	-814.59	-2590.45
	(1299.62)	(1310.13)	(1490.03)	(1697.25)	(1564.31)	(1597.91)	(1796.43)	(2107.45)
Mutual MisTTw	-2852.18*	-2883.46*	786.26	-2943.82*	-2902.48	-2927.58	368.37	-2950.56
	(1559.95)	(1557.92)	(1516.70)	(1563.36)	(1860.22)	(1876.34)	(1946.56)	(1882.20)
Treatment × Mutual MisTTw	8737.20**	8868.85**		8731.04**	9265.79*	9359.45*		9282.79*
	(3679.45)	(3570.01)		(3470.71)	(4917.53)	(4860.78)		(4772.91)
femp6=1		-407.40	-1143.09	-1358.20		-291.30	-1017.70	-1102.89
		(1290.42)	(1830.16)	(1799.21)		(1663.01)	(2176.86)	(2126.29)
Treatment × femp6=1			2470.42	2048.09			2041.31	1721.10
			(2728.29)	(2582.01)			(3321.64)	(3136.61)
Lagged outcome	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.18
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.23
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.18
Observations	284	283	283	283	184	183	183	183
PANEL C: Spousal control proxy: Leaving the house unescorted								
Dependent variable: Total savings balance								
FM in trust game:	W/H	W/H	W/H	W/H	W	W	W	W
Treatment	-2404.92*	-2324.25*	-1234.18	-2632.35*	-1990.69	-2042.21	-318.03	-1953.07
	(1299.62)	(1301.07)	(1379.23)	(1583.32)	(1564.31)	(1589.12)	(1603.81)	(1910.75)
Mutual MisTTw	-2852.18*	-2846.26*	735.51	-2843.20*	-2902.48	-3016.07	255.25	-3025.63
	(1559.95)	(1549.51)	(1483.20)	(1559.05)	(1860.22)	(1852.91)	(1895.39)	(1842.81)
Treatment × Mutual MisTTw	8737.20**	8562.12**		8416.14**	9265.79*	9150.66*		9192.30**
	(3679.45)	(3543.53)		(3376.46)	(4917.53)	(4785.45)		(4608.75)
femp7=1		853.59	300.20	309.68		1509.24	1437.20	1682.44
		(1401.39)	(1906.69)	(1905.88)		(1892.71)	(2349.47)	(2345.95)
Treatment × femp7=1			1999.96	1218.99			490.78	-378.17
			(3095.94)	(2864.40)			(4018.61)	(3653.75)
Lagged outcome	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.18
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
R^2	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.23
Adj. R^2	0.15	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.18
Observations	284	284	284	284	184	184	184	184
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: Regression only employs observations from female participants. Columns 4, 5 and 6 restrict the sample to trust games with the wife (W) being the first mover (FM), i.e. the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness are measured in these columns. Spousal financial control is a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if the wife negatively replied with 'No' to the question 'Are you involved in decisions about money in your home?'. All regressions include stratification variables, namely baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A21: Robustness saving outcomes: Sensitivity to outliers

PANEL A: Mutual mistrust/untrustworthiness
Dependent variable: Total savings balance

Data:	Not winsorised/trimmed			Winsor 1%			Winsor 5%			Trimm 2%		
FM in trust game:	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treatment	2448.38	-894.97	4975.33	-887.61	-682.08	-1130.31	-1306.30	-1391.11	-1452.60	-1662.55	-929.14	-2355.53
	(3815.53)	(2526.43)	(7111.17)	(1475.97)	(1966.95)	(2245.03)	(806.08)	(934.12)	(1410.02)	(1355.09)	(1815.46)	(2059.07)
No TTw	-3815.54	-1673.76	-9234.33	-2006.10	-2760.70	-1109.67	-421.22	-1080.77	497.57	-1618.47	-2452.45	-300.17
	(3074.00)	(3033.83)	(15504.67)	(1725.72)	(2146.73)	(3154.11)	(1062.57)	(1171.07)	(2975.87)	(1663.82)	(1976.32)	(2803.78)
Treatment × No TTw	26637.95	24840.29*	36483.60	6524.48	10697.10*	2860.55	2117.35	4284.54*	-48.50	2179.81	3611.15	249.10
	(17498.84)	(14460.96)	(36716.50)	(3976.08)	(5792.54)	(5484.94)	(1854.50)	(2478.60)	(3476.43)	(2523.89)	(3218.76)	(3382.23)
Lagged Outcome	0.04	0.34***	-0.12	0.34*	0.47**	0.01	0.35*	0.23	0.49	-0.02*	0.03	-0.02**
	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.15)	(0.35)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.01)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.09	0.30	0.10	0.17	0.26	0.10	0.20	0.27	0.19	0.13	0.14	0.18
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.26	0.02	0.14	0.22	0.02	0.18	0.22	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.11

PANEL B: Trust and trustworthiness index
Dependent variable: Total savings balance

Data:	Not winsorised/trimmed			Winsor 1%			Winsor 5%			Trimm 2%		
FM in trust game:	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treatment	28774.21	23197.20	39975.06	5468.78	9529.22*	1513.29	739.14	2724.18	-1561.51	400.36	2537.36	-2184.81
	(17611.62)	(14352.74)	(37358.58)	(3634.34)	(5340.68)	(5095.85)	(1623.67)	(2252.60)	(3303.53)	(2005.23)	(2610.62)	(2689.62)
TTw index = 1	8694.58**	8268.82*	13944.58	4882.35*	6843.28**	439.64	2303.93	2894.67*	298.35	3841.96	5186.87*	-527.09
	(4237.75)	(4381.64)	(18546.20)	(2765.12)	(3425.58)	(4256.46)	(1552.05)	(1646.72)	(3784.59)	(2509.47)	(2922.54)	(4004.13)
TTw index = 2	-907.61	-6367.48	11022.97	-1197.63	-2523.97	-71.95	-1338.06	-955.40	-3121.23	-807.96	-1452.53	-1148.61
	(3675.03)	(4151.79)	(17533.02)	(2056.30)	(2155.96)	(4751.66)	(1216.38)	(1308.18)	(3336.54)	(1979.99)	(1737.56)	(4281.26)
TTw index = 3	2628.78	-864.12	5578.45	1439.32	1441.89	1528.17	-92.20	419.89	-144.68	1201.55	1921.41	1073.89
	(3236.49)	(3910.56)	(15352.96)	(1897.81)	(2365.21)	(3337.80)	(1168.82)	(1371.69)	(3092.71)	(1893.77)	(2338.60)	(3141.99)
Treatment × TTw index = 1	-36560.67*	-34639.93**	-50407.05	-10921.90**	-16856.39**	-3696.40	-4582.18**	-7064.46**	-655.11	-6006.41*	-9268.43**	212.37
	(19007.05)	(16593.27)	(43122.21)	(4792.68)	(6554.31)	(6835.57)	(2294.67)	(2803.70)	(4490.51)	(3175.62)	(3844.68)	(4613.98)
Treatment × TTw index = 2	-25555.96	-13198.47	-45238.69	-4322.52	-3791.57	-4508.10	-1508.05	-2467.76	679.82	322.16	2434.08	-243.40
	(16814.48)	(13606.12)	(38107.46)	(4134.93)	(6437.58)	(6768.97)	(1968.35)	(2726.00)	(3764.84)	(3222.63)	(5212.39)	(4975.67)
Treatment × TTw index = 3	-16933.28	-20370.74	-13830.15	-3358.66	-7597.87	1409.81	8.72	-2214.71	1771.38	-2.28	-1347.43	1155.02
	(18893.79)	(13583.56)	(39457.67)	(4361.12)	(6201.38)	(6287.58)	(2081.91)	(2751.13)	(3698.21)	(3096.14)	(4066.29)	(4116.74)
Lagged Outcome	0.04	0.35***	-0.12	0.35*	0.48**	0.02	0.34*	0.23	0.48	-0.02	0.05	-0.02**
	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.34)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.10	0.32	0.12	0.19	0.29	0.13	0.23	0.30	0.22	0.14	0.17	0.19
Adj. R^2	0.06	0.27	0.01	0.15	0.24	0.02	0.19	0.24	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.09
Observations	338	202	136	338	202	136	338	202	136	331	198	133
Mean control	7964.73	7868.86	8149.72	7674.07	7463.96	8079.54	5948.32	5663.05	6498.84	7367.39	6958.28	8149.72
	(1041.120)	(1335.63)	(1647.25)	(921.40)	(1116.82)	(1638.18)	(583.39)	(640.37)	(1186.29)	(857.96)	(986.12)	(1647.25)

Notes: Estimations employs initial, winsorised and trimmed savings and income data at different levels, as indicated in the top row. Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the husband (H) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each spouse was measured. Columns 2, 5, 8 and 11 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 3, 6, 9 and 12). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category being No TTw = 1 (TTw Index = 0), i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. Remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A22: Robustness saving outcomes: Quantile regressions

PANEL A: Wife's mistrust and husband's untrustworthiness Dependent variable: Total savings balance						
Quantile:	0.025	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.9	0.975
First mover in trust game:	W	W	W	W	W	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	-167.27**	-147.44	-340.94	-359.78	285.56	15819.71
	(64.48)	(509.12)	(601.26)	(2376.13)	(3582.14)	(14158.75)
No TTw	-94.61	714.78	-457.87	27.41	-1463.83	7663.11
	(77.21)	(1056.81)	(814.26)	(4160.58)	(7248.96)	(13367.36)
Treatment × No TTw	259.78**	245.60	1193.72	4779.97	86241.06*	55268.46*
	(105.72)	(1500.82)	(2052.98)	(9723.92)	(51396.24)	(31337.13)
Lagged Outcome	0.00	0.15	0.32**	0.30	0.26	1.61
	(0.01)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.28)	(2.23)	(1.40)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pseudo R^2	0.00	0.06	0.12	0.18	0.24	0.54
PANEL B: Trust and trustworthiness index Dependent variable: Total savings balance						
Quantile:	0.025	0.25	0.5	0.75	0.9	0.975
First mover in trust game:	W	W	W	W	W	W
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment	138.41	32.45	316.60	4677.36	85741.20*	68303.27***
	(255.82)	(809.53)	(1887.89)	(9173.27)	(48919.45)	(10252.46)
TTw index = 1	410.65*	370.40	1457.02	4709.24	25654.31***	51203.49
	(245.94)	(869.37)	(1562.71)	(6418.35)	(6882.32)	(36379.39)
TTw index = 2	426.26*	-1125.41	-1330.00*	-2400.16	-5928.97	-27370.93**
	(244.32)	(752.59)	(723.21)	(2735.53)	(6441.37)	(10579.14)
TTw index = 3	136.90	-867.22	-673.63	-38.81	-184.99	-15428.17
	(254.08)	(668.72)	(650.08)	(2835.74)	(6322.68)	(10202.55)
Treatment × TTw index = 1	-1341.31***	-1427.54	-2546.51	-10303.92	-112984.23**	-132823.10***
	(264.87)	(1147.85)	(2455.51)	(11159.26)	(49131.03)	(36477.25)
Treatment × TTw index = 2	-676.19**	503.82	1489.11	-1349.25	-74276.70	1599.03
	(316.19)	(964.18)	(2386.89)	(10242.74)	(63511.65)	(10940.35)
Treatment × TTw index = 3	38.90	86.63	218.89	-3580.94	-83667.20*	-33983.30
	(262.14)	(1011.31)	(2066.15)	(9645.62)	(49425.00)	(23146.24)
Lagged Outcome	0.04***	0.16	0.32**	0.30*	0.27	2.16***
	(0.00)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(2.26)	(0.08)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pseudo R^2	0.01	0.06	0.13	0.19	0.29	0.62
Observations	202	202	202	202	202	202

Notes: Reported are quantile regressions with regard to the distribution of the dependent variable (past month savings at endline). All regressions only report the subsample of decisions in the trust game in which the wife was the first mover and the husband the second mover, i.e. the wife's trust and the husband's trustworthiness were measured. TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category being No TTw = 1 (TTw Index = 0), i.e. husband and wife both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. Remaining categories are: 1 = husband chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Husband chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw. All regressions include stratification variables, namely gender and baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A23: Alternative trust game sample: Baseline balance

Variable	(1) Control (N=65)	(2) Treatment (N=72)	T-test Difference (1)-(2)
Female	0.954	0.917	0.037
	(0.026)	(0.033)	
Age	32.615	34.611	-1.996
	(1.119)	(1.307)	
Belongs to scheduled/backward caste or tribe	0.523	0.556	-0.032
	(0.062)	(0.059)	
Hindu	0.662	0.694	-0.033
	(0.059)	(0.055)	
Household members	4.200	4.056	0.144
	(0.241)	(0.238)	
Unemployed	0.354	0.222	0.132*
	(0.060)	(0.049)	
No education	0.185	0.250	-0.065
	(0.048)	(0.051)	
Completed primary education	0.123	0.250	-0.127*
	(0.041)	(0.051)	
Completed secondary education	0.400	0.292	0.108
	(0.061)	(0.054)	
Completed tertiary education	0.292	0.208	0.084
	(0.057)	(0.048)	
Past-month income	8923.744	8861.682	62.062
	(929.381)	(987.393)	
Total savings balance	6017.385	4552.222	1465.162
	(1160.242)	(676.827)	
Bank account savings balance	3270.769	2128.472	1142.297
	(862.676)	(499.723)	
National account savings balance	657.385	659.167	-1.782
	(298.476)	(314.320)	
Savings balance at home	816.923	597.917	219.006
	(134.907)	(111.928)	
Past-month temptation spending	118.185	153.583	-35.399
	(19.122)	(36.954)	
Female empowerment index	0.270	-0.003	0.273
	(0.179)	(0.150)	
Self-efficacy index	5.659	6.012	-0.352
	(0.334)	(0.261)	
Outstanding debt	2451.077	1513.194	937.882
	(493.774)	(387.139)	
Past-month household expenditures	5141.154	6127.111	-985.957
	(967.671)	(1084.576)	
Resilience index	0.300	0.284	0.016
	(0.051)	(0.050)	
Number of total assets	9.769	9.514	0.255
	(0.329)	(0.314)	
Number of housing assets	7.415	7.306	0.110
	(0.239)	(0.237)	
F-test of joint significance (F-stat)			1.112
F-test, number of observations			137

Notes: Means and standard errors (in parentheses) displayed for the full sample, treatment and control group. All missing values in balance variables are replaced with the mean value of this variable. ***, **, and * would indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

TABLE A24: Alternative trust game sample: Saving heterogeneity in trust and trustworthiness

Dependent variable: Total savings balance									
FM in trust game:		W/HHM	W/HHM	W	HHM	W/HHM	W/HHM	W	HHM
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Treatment	1129.21	1031.69	835.84	1503.67	1996.59	1155.91	1338.52	4603.24	-3498.44
	(2465.58)	(2385.02)	(2627.98)	(4047.06)	(3383.36)	(2402.88)	(3431.87)	(4896.84)	(3774.22)
No TTw		1322.47	748.34	-2305.73	4632.51				
		(4048.67)	(3309.45)	(4666.28)	(5442.08)				
Treatment × No TTw			995.35	8196.87	-10195.03				
			(8025.06)	(11528.74)	(7396.57)				
Mutual TTw						180.69	438.38	3066.10	-5400.11
						(2309.36)	(3655.58)	(5624.92)	(3961.00)
Treatment × Mutual TTw							-564.26	-3898.56	8577.84
							(5867.20)	(7837.40)	(6737.83)
Lagged Outcome	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.28	0.99	-0.02	-0.01	-0.23	0.97
	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.55)	(0.78)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.19	0.23	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.24
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05
Observations	124	124	124	73	51	124	124	73	51
Mean control	9182.90	9182.90	9182.90	9781.67	8563.48	9182.90	9182.90	9781.67	8563.48
	(1771.16)	(1771.16)	(1771.16)	(2991.27)	(1899.07)	(1771.16)	(1771.16)	(2991.27)	(1899.07)

Notes: Estimation employs the sample with the trust game played between main participant and an adult household member (who is not the husband) and only employs the subsample of female participants. Columns 4, 5, 8 and 9 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the household member (HHM) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each player was measured. Columns 4 and 8 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the household member's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for columns 5 and 9). All regressions include stratification variables, namely baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

TABLE A25: Alternative trust game sample: Saving heterogeneity in trust and trustworthiness index

Dependent variable: Total savings balance					
FM in trust game:		W/H	W/H	W	H
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment	1129.21	1427.91	1629.53	9073.93	-8012.02
	(2465.58)	(2323.94)	(7385.44)	(11376.05)	(6974.67)
TTw index = 1		-3795.47	-7558.54**	-2195.10	-13054.40
		(4908.67)	(3536.50)	(5988.12)	(7758.36)
TTw index = 2		414.95	2380.81	3359.31	-7.07
		(4590.66)	(4345.77)	(8044.66)	(7066.18)
TTw index = 3		-873.41	-476.01	3332.75	-6606.58
		(4113.42)	(4190.34)	(6236.30)	(5717.86)
Treatment × TTw index = 1			5394.71	-3375.32	18548.66*
			(8043.36)	(11281.73)	(9528.58)
Treatment × TTw index = 2			-4116.76	-10791.98	4938.64
			(9276.70)	(15170.68)	(9157.02)
Treatment × TTw index = 3			-953.69	-8494.93	12031.69
			(9142.93)	(13217.60)	(8857.17)
Lagged outcome	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09	-0.31	1.04
	(0.51)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.60)	(0.78)
Stratification variables	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.20	0.30
Adj. R^2	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.02
Observations	124	124	124	73	51

Notes: Estimation employs the sample with the trust game played between main participant and an adult household member (who is not the husband) and only employs the subsample of female participants. Columns 4 and 5 restrict the sample to trust games with regard to the wife (W) or the household member (HHM) being the first mover (FM) as to distinguish between whether trust or trustworthiness of each player was measured. Column 4 employ the sample of trust games for which the wife's trust and the household member's trustworthiness were measured (vice versa for column 5). TTw index is a categorical variable of the different trust and trustworthiness combinations with the reference category (TTw Index = 0) being No TTw = 1, i.e. wife and household member both chose not to trust or to be trustworthy depending on who was first or second mover. The remaining categories are: 1 = household member chose to trust or be trustworthy, wife did not chose to trust or be trustworthy, 2 = Household member chose not to trust or be trustworthy, wife chose to trust or be trustworthy, 3 = both chose to trust or be trustworthy, equal to Mutual TTw = 1. All regressions include stratification variables, namely baseline savings quintile, as well as controls, namely the main participant's age, education, employment status, income and household size. Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$