The Kremlin's New Digital Frontier: How Globalization Revived Soviet Active Measures in the Modern Era

Maxwell Goodman

This article analyzes how the Russian Federation has revived and transformed Soviet-era political warfare to operate in a globalized, digitized world. Central to this transformation are active measures—a Cold War-era toolkit of covert tactics including disinformation, propaganda, forgeries, and front organizations—now repurposed for contemporary strategic influence.[1]

Globalization, driven by technological innovation, economic interdependence, and the rise of digital media, has reshaped these once-centralized operations into decentralized, adaptive tools integral to Putin-era statecraft.[2] These tactics operate within a broader strategy of hybrid warfare, which blends military force with cyber capabilities, economic coercion, and information manipulation to achieve political goals below the threshold of open conflict.

Modern Russian disinformation efforts thrive in networked media ecosystems—digitally connected spaces where flexible narratives and algorithm-driven content help the Kremlin spread instability quickly and effectively. To analyze this transformation, this paper is organized around five dimensions: technological innovation, hybrid warfare integration, evolving target audiences, economic interdependence, and ideological realignment. Together, these reveal that Cold War-era techniques were not abandoned but systematically reengineered to exploit the strategic vulnerabilities of the 21st-century international system.

INTRODUCTION

In an era of global interconnectivity, where information flows shape political outcomes, data has become both a weapon and a battlefield. Far from a novel development, narrative manipulation is a deeply entrenched strategy for Russia—one rooted in Soviet-era doctrines that used influence operations to weaken adversaries and shape international perceptions.[3]

These operations began with the Cheka—the Bolshevik secret police and precursor to the KGB—which deployed disinformation, subversion, and psychological manipulation as instruments of statecraft. By the Cold War, such tactics had evolved into a formal doctrine under the KGB's First Main Directorate and became collectively known as активные мероприятия, or active measures.[4] These campaigns ranged from forging documents and infiltrating civil society groups to launching cultural disinformation efforts. One such operation, "Seat 12," sought to discredit the Catholic Church by portraying Pope Pius XII as complicit in Nazi crimes, using fabricated archives and influencing cultural media to sway opinion.[5]

Grounded in a zero-sum ideological worldview, Soviet active measures extended into media, academia, and international institutions. Though the USSR's collapse in 1991 disrupted these operations, their institutional memory endured. In the post-Soviet 1990s, active measures largely receded—but beginning in the early 2000s under Vladimir Putin, they were revived, digitally reengineered, and strategically embedded into Russia's foreign policy apparatus.[6]

As these tactics evolved from analog forgeries to digitally driven campaigns, this analysis argues that globalization has not merely revived Soviet-style active measures—it has fundamentally reshaped them. Fueled by digital media, economic interdependence, and decentralized information flows, Russia's political warfare now blends Cold War-era tactics with modern tools of psychological and algorithmic manipulation.[7] This study examines five key areas of transformation—technological innovation, hybrid warfare integration, evolving target audiences, economic leverage, and ideological realignment—to show how the Kremlin has adapted legacy strategies to exploit the vulnerabilities of a globalized 21st-century information environment.

At the heart of this transformation lies a crucial shift: Russia's goal is no longer ideological conversion but strategic paralysis. Through the weaponization of conflicting narratives—often playing both sides of contentious debates—the Kremlin aims to fragment democratic societies from within. In this chaotic information landscape, truth becomes relative, democratic institutions lose legitimacy, and authoritarianism presents itself as the only stable alternative.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION

Technology has been the most transformative force in how globalization has shaped Russian influence. The rise of the internet and social media has exponentially increased the scale, speed, and precision of disinformation operations. Unlike Cold War-era leaflets or forged press clippings, modern tactics operate in real time with global reach and plausible deniability.[8]

Russian state-sponsored actors like the Internet Research Agency (IRA) have weaponized these platforms to infiltrate online communities, manipulate public narratives, and exploit algorithmic biases. During the 2016 U.S. presidential election, IRA operatives deployed thousands of fake accounts to spread divisive content across issues like race, immigration, and religion. These posts, precisely targeted to individual users based on harvested personal data, ultimately reached over 126 million Americans. The goal was not to convince but to divide, confuse, and inflame.[9] The IRA's activities were not freelance disruptions but components of a Kremlin-directed influence campaign, as confirmed by U.S.

intelligence assessments and investigative reports that traced financial and operational ties directly to Yevgeny Prigozhin—a close Putin ally, the founder of the Wagner mercenary group, and the chief architect behind the IRA's operations during that period, who would later stage a short-lived mutiny against the Russian military leadership in 2023.[10]

While Soviet-era campaigns promoted Marxist ideology to advance a coherent worldview, modern Russian disinformation is less concerned with persuasion and more focused on psychological disruption. It is data-driven and precisely calibrated—relying on behavioral profiling, psychographic targeting, and algorithmic feedback to exploit individuals' emotional triggers and cognitive vulnerabilities. These tactics echo the Soviet principle of reflexive control—a doctrine that seeks to manipulate an adversary's decision-making process by shaping the information they receive and influencing how they interpret it. In the digital era, this principle has evolved into faster, more immersive techniques. Cognitive overload, confirmation bias, the illusory truth effect, and algorithmic reinforcement all play roles in making falsehoods more persuasive and persistent.[11]

Groups like Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear—linked to the Russian military intelligence agency (GRU) and the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), respectively—have carried out high-profile operations such as the 2016 Democratic National Committee (DNC) hack,

leaking sensitive data to erode trust in Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party.[12] Emerging tools like deepfakes and AI-generated content further blur the line between reality and fabrication—for instance, in 2024, a deepfake video falsely showing Ukrainian President Zelenskyy urging his troops to surrender briefly spread online before being debunked, illustrating the destabilizing power of synthetic media in wartime.[13]

Such acts of sabotage are important to the Kremlin as they enable engagement without crossing into open warfare—leveraging covert action, propaganda, and surveillance to destabilize societies without direct military confrontation. Their objective is not simply disruption, but the systematic erosion of trust in democratic institutions, political leadership, and shared truths. By flooding the information space with uncertainty and manufacturing crises of legitimacy, these operations paralyze decision-making, fracture public consensus, and create openings for authoritarian influence to expand unchallenged.[14]

These innovations represent not just enhancements but a full-scale reinvention of Soviet methods—producing disinformation that is more scalable, adaptive, and evasive than ever before. In today's digital landscape, anyone with a screen can both absorb and spread propagandistic content, often unknowingly becoming a conduit for these modern active measures.

INTEGRATION INTO HYBRID WARFARE STRATEGY

Modern Russia embeds disinformation at the heart of its hybrid warfare doctrine—a strategy combining military force, cyber operations, economic pressure, and narrative manipulation to achieve geopolitical goals with minimal direct confrontation, as outlined in what Western analysts have termed the Gerasimov Doctrine, named after Russian General Valery Gerasimov. Unlike Cold War-era active measures, which typically functioned alongside traditional military operations, modern Russian campaigns integrate disinformation directly with both kinetic (i.e., physical military force) and digital operations, creating a seamless strategy designed to confuse, paralyze,

and delay adversary responses.[15]

In the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russian hackers launched DDoS attacks on Georgian government websites, targeting news and communication platforms at the exact moment of military escalation. Simultaneously, Russian media circulated the false narrative that Georgia had committed genocide in South Ossetia, creating international ambiguity about the aggressor and stalling Western intervention.[16]

In Crimea (2014), disinformation, cyberattacks, and military force converged in a playbook Putin would

refine. As "little green men"—unmarked Russian soldiers—seized infrastructure, Russian state media and bot networks flooded the information space with claims that Kyiv had been overtaken by fascists, that ethnic Russians faced imminent genocide, and that Crimea was merely conducting a legal self-determination referendum.[17] These narratives neutralized international outrage long enough for annexation to become a fait accompli.

The 2022 invasion of Ukraine saw even more systematic coordination. Russian Telegram channels circulated fake videos mimicking Western news outlets like the BBC and Deutsche Welle, falsely accusing Ukraine of staging atrocities. Meanwhile, cyberattacks targeted Ukrainian banks and government websites to undermine trust and operational capacity.[18] Disinformation narratives were calibrated not just for foreign audiences, but also for domestic consumption—reframing the war as a defensive operation against NATO encroachment and fabricated "biolabs" on Russia's doorstep.

Hybrid warfare is not a patchwork strategy; it is a synchronized method wherein disinformation clears the path for tanks, and cyberattacks are sequenced with narrative distortion to disorient both foreign governments and local populations. The ultimate objective is not mere disruption, but the systematic erosion of democratic resilience—undermining institutions, paralyzing response, and tilting the global balance of power toward authoritarian advantage.

SHIFTS IN TARGET AUDIENCES AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TACTICS

Soviet-era active measures primarily targeted elites—policymakers, journalists, and ideological sympathizers—through indirect, slow-moving channels such as forged documents, planted media stories, and diplomatic networks. A notable example is Operation Denver, a 1980s campaign that falsely claimed the United States had engineered the HIV/AIDS virus as a bioweapon. The goal was not mass persuasion, but elite disruption: sowing doubt among those who shaped policy and global opinion, particularly in the Global South.[19]

Today, Russian disinformation campaigns operate in a radically different media environment. Social media platforms like Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), and YouTube have transformed influence operations into decentralized, participatory ecosystems, where ordinary users amplify malign narratives—often unknowingly. This shift illustrates how globalization, especially in the digital sphere, has democratized the tools of influence. Disinformation now spreads at scale, with minimal cost and limited state visibility, allowing Russia to erode public trust, polarize societies, and destabilize adversaries far more efficiently than during the Cold War.

Though already cited as an example of Russia's technological adaptation, the Kremlin's interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election also illustrates the broader transformation of Soviet-era tactics into digitally enabled political warfare. Russian operatives from the Internet Research Agency (IRA) exploited social media algorithms to inflame partisan divisions, targeting specific ideological and demographic groups with tailored content.[20] Fabricated headlines, such as false claims that Hillary Clinton sold weapons to ISIS, reached millions of Americans. The objective was not to promote a consistent worldview but to fragment the public sphere by heightening anger, confusion, and distrust.[21] These efforts focused on emotionally charged identity issues—race, immigration, religion—calibrated through data analytics and timed for maximum disruption.[22] This strategy aligns with a central tenet of Russian information warfare: destabilization through psychological manipulation, rather than ideological conversion.[23]

A similar pattern emerged after the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 in 2014. When Russian-backed separatists shot down the civilian airliner over eastern Ukraine, killing 298 people, Russian state media and proxy accounts unleashed a flood of contradictory narratives: blaming Ukraine, accusing the CIA of staging the incident, or denying

involvement altogether.[24] The goal was to overwhelm, not persuade—to create so much informational noise that truth became inaccessible and accountability was delayed or deflected. Like the 2016 election, the MH17 disinformation campaign weaponized public uncertainty to paralyze judgment and obscure Russian responsibility.

Russia applied the same playbook during the COVID-19 pandemic, disseminating conflicting narratives about vaccine safety, virus origins, and Western health authorities. These operations eroded confidence in science, amplified anti-government sentiment, and deepened societal fractures during a global crisis. Taken together, these examples illustrate how modern active measures prioritize disruption over persuasion—reframing information warfare as a psychological campaign against social cohesion itself. By attacking shared facts, common identities, and institutional legitimacy, Russian disinformation aims to weaken a society's capacity for unified, democratic response.[25]

EXPLOITATION OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE

Although often treated as distinct from narrative manipulation, Russia's exploitation of economic interdependence functions as a critical extension of its information warfare strategy. Economic coercion—particularly through energy and finance—frequently works in tandem with narrative warfare, reinforcing propaganda themes that cast Russia as a victim of Western aggression and position the Kremlin as a defender of national sovereignty against foreign encroachment.[26]

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union maintained a largely autarkic economic system, trading primarily within its ideological bloc and remaining isolated from Western financial and commodity markets. In contrast, modern Russia exploits global markets, particularly energy dependencies, as tools of influence. Natural gas exports—especially via infrastructure like Nord Stream 1 and 2—serve as geopolitical levers, particularly in Europe.[27] In 2009 and again in 2022, Russia curtailed gas flows to pressure European states and punish support for Ukraine. These actions destabilized energy markets and highlighted Europe's strategic vulnerabilities. Energy is not just a commodity for Russia—it is a weapon.[28]

Beyond energy, Russia uses targeted trade restrictions to punish geopolitical dissent and reinforce political narratives. The 2006 bans on Georgian and Moldovan wine, and the 2014 embargo on European agricultural imports, exemplify how Moscow pairs economic coercion with information campaigns to shape public perception. These trade measures are often framed not merely as retaliatory actions, but as defensive responses to alleged Western aggression—bolstering narratives that portray Russia as a besieged sovereign power resisting foreign interference. In doing so, Russia weaponizes economic tools not just to inflict costs, but to legitimize its foreign policy and galvanize domestic support.[29]

Russia also exploits the financial openness of globalization to covertly project its influence. By channeling oligarch-controlled wealth—capital held by Kremlin-aligned billionaires with strategic stakes in foreign economies—into political donations, real estate, and lobbying efforts, Moscow has embedded itself within Western financial systems and policymaking circles. Projects like the Southern Gas Corridor—designed to reduce Europe's dependence on Russian energy—have faced opposition not only through Kremlin-backed lobbying efforts, but also through disinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting the project and sowing doubt about its economic and environmental viability.[30] This economic manipulation reflects a shift from ideology to opportunism. Influence is now transactional—wielded through pipelines, markets, and money flows rather than slogans.

IDEOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY AND STRATEGIC REALIGNMENT

Unlike the USSR, which rigidly promoted Marxist-Leninist ideology abroad, modern Russia embraces ideological opportunism—strategically adopting and amplifying any narrative that undermines its adversaries, regardless of internal coherence. In recent years, the Kremlin has positioned itself internationally as a defender of traditional conservative values, casting the "decadent" West as morally corrupt and culturally degenerate.[31] Rather than advancing a singular doctrine, Russia thrives on strategic opportunism, leveraging discord wherever it appears. Yet behind this ideological fluidity lies a consistent strategic posture: a worldview rooted in grievance, suspicion, and the belief that global politics is a zero-sum game. In this framework, it is not necessary for the Kremlin to believe in the content of the narratives it spreads—only that they weaken adversaries and reinforce the notion that it is Russia against a hostile, encircling West.[32]

Although the Kremlin publicly champions traditional conservative values, it remains willing to align with a wide range of ideological movements to sow division and disrupt political cohesion abroad. In Europe, Russia has offered material and media support to both far-right parties like France's National Rally (formerly National Front) and far-left parties like Greece's Syriza, depending on the geopolitical leverage desired. Leaked emails from Kremlin-linked groups and intelligence reports show financing and disinformation support for populist politicians who advocate for EU disintegration, NATO withdrawal, or closer ties to Moscow.[33]

Russian media outlets have also tailored messaging to appeal to these factions. To right-wing audiences, RT and Sputnik emphasize anti-immigration rhetoric, traditional Christian values, and anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment—themes that align with nationalist movements in Hungary, Poland, and parts of the U.S. To left-wing audiences, the same outlets shift tone to highlight anti-capitalist narratives, U.S. imperialism, and racial inequality—often mimicking the language of social justice while injecting Kremlin-friendly distortions.[34]

This strategic ambiguity is evident in Russian support for pro-Brexit narratives, anti-vaccine campaigns, and anti-5G conspiracy theories—none of which require ideological coherence or a consistent worldview, only a destabilizing effect.[35] In leaked Kremlin strategy documents from 2022, the Social Design Agency, a Russian consulting firm with ties to state-backed influence operations, outlined how to segment audiences by political orientation and target them with conflicting narratives to deepen social fragmentation. By crafting campaigns tailored to specific political events, such as European elections, the SDA utilized tools like memes and videos to shape public discourse and advance Kremlin objectives.[36]

CONCLUSION

The evolution of Russian active measures from Cold War tactics to digital-era hybrid warfare signals a profound shift in global conflict. While the Yeltsin era gestured toward liberalization, it laid the groundwork for Putin's recalibration of Soviet influence strategies—blending them with the speed, reach, and ambiguity afforded by globalization.

Today's active measures do not simply distort facts; they undermine the very concept of truth. Russia's strategy is not to persuade the world of a particular vision but to render all visions suspect. In this environment, democratic societies struggle not only with external threats, but with internal crises of trust, identity, and cohesion—exacerbated by carefully calibrated information warfare.

Globalization and digitization did not make Soviet techniques irrelevant; they weaponized them—amplifying their speed, reach, and subtlety into

more powerful and insidious tools. What was once a clandestine playbook of forgeries and front groups is now a seamless, ever-evolving campaign conducted through social media platforms, proxy media outlets, and economic entanglements. The new active measures operate at the intersection of psychology, technology, and ideology, targeting the operating systems of democratic life itself.

In an era where narratives travel faster than facts, defending democracy requires more than cybersecurity or fact-checking — it demands a strategic literacy—an understanding of how influence works across technological, psychological, and ideological dimensions. Russia's transformation of disinformation from Cold War relic to digital arsenal is a case study in how autocracies adapt—and a warning to liberal democracies that the battlefield of perception is as decisive as any terrain on a map.

Maxwell Goodman, a rising sophomore from Los Angeles, studies History and International Affairs at Northeastern University with a minor in Russian Language. His academic interests center on Soviet and post-Soviet political culture, and the strategic use of media, language, and propaganda in shaping state power and public memory.

A classically trained violinist, he studies at the New England Conservatory and will continue his Russian studies this summer at the Middlebury Language Schools. As a 2025 Jeffrey Burds Fellow, Maxwell will be assisting Professor Erina Megowan on research into Soviet war journalism and cultural propaganda during World War II.

This paper was advised by Professor Panagoula Diamanti-Karanou in Globalization and International Affairs.

Endnotes

1 Robert L. Hutchings, review of Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare, by Keir Giles, Air University Press, August 24, 2023, 1, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-Reviews/Display/Article/3143126/active-measures-the-secret-histor y-of-disinformation-and-political-warfare/.

2 Max Bergmann et al., Russia's Shadow War Against the West (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2023), 6, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west.

3 Ibid., 2.

4 Danny Bird, "How the 'Red Terror' Exposed the True Turmoil of Soviet Russia 100 Years Ago," Time, September 5, 2018, 1, https://time.com/5386789/red-terror-soviet-history/.

5 Edward Pentin, "Pope Pius and the Myth of Hitler's Pope," National Catholic Register, September 7, 2023,1–4, https://www.ncregister.com/news/pope-pius-and-the-myth-of-hitler-s-pope.

6 Mark Galeotti, "Active Measures: Russia's Covert Geopolitical Operations," George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies no. 31 (2019): 2, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/.active-measures-russias-covert-geopolitical-operations-0.

7 Danny Bird, "How the 'Red Terror' Exposed the True Turmoil of Soviet Russia 100 Years Ago," Time, September 5, 2018, 1, https://time.com/5386789/red-terror-soviet-history/.

8 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, Russia's Use of Media and Information Operations in the Ukraine Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016), 2–4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

9 Cecilia Kang, "Facebook's Troll Farms and the 2020 U.S. Election," MIT Technology Review, September 16, 2021, 5–6, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/09/16/1035851/facebook-troll-farms-report-us-2020-election/.

10 Ashley L. Bender and Lily Hughes, "What to Know About Notorious Mercenary Organization 'The Wagner Group' and Its Founder," Time, April 1, 2023, accessed June 14, 2025, Ebsco (via TIME.com), https://time.com/6251579/wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-putin/.

11 Kang, "Facebook's Troll Farms and the 2020 U.S. Election," 5–6.

12 Sean Gallagher, "DNC Email Leak the Work of a Russian Hack, Says Cybersecurity Firm," The Guardian, July 26, 2016, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/26/dnc-email-leak-russian-hack-guccifer-2.

13 Bobby Allyn, "Deepfake Video of Zelenskyy Could Be 'Tip of the Iceberg' in Info War, Experts Warn," NPR, March 16, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia.

14 Grace B. Mueller and Brandon Valeriano, Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War: From Strange Patterns to Alternative Futures (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 18, 2023), 1-2.

15 NATO, Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare (Brussels: NATO, July 2024), 8-9, https://www.nato.int/nato-static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/7/pdf/241007-hybrid-threats-and-hybrid-warfare.pdf.

16 Stephen McGlinchey, "Russia's Hybrid Aggression against Georgia: The Use of Local and External Tools," Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 28, 2018, 4, https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-hybrid-aggression-against-georgia-use-local-and-external-tools.

17 Alan Kelly and Christopher Paul, Decoding Crimea: Pinpointing the Influence Strategies of Modern Information Warfare (Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2020), 18, https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/decoding-crimea-pinpointing-the-influence-strategies-of-modern-information-warfare/64.

18 "Disinformation on Telegram: How Russian Propaganda Works in Temporarily Occupied Territories," EU Neighbours East, accessed June 14, 2025, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/stories/disinformation-on-telegram-how-russian-propaganda-works-in-temporarily-occupied-territories/, 1-3.

19 Douglas Selvage, "Operation Denver: The KGB and Stasi Disinformation Regarding AIDS," Wilson Center, May 8, 2020, 1, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/operation-denver-kgb-and-stasi-disinformation-regarding-aids.

20 Kang, "Facebook's Troll Farms and the 2020 U.S. Election," 5–6.

21 Christina Georgacopoulos and Grayce Mores, How Fake News Affected the 2016 Presidential Election (Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Fight Fake News, July 2020), 5–6.

22 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Washington, DC: Intelligence Community Assessment 2017-01D, January 6, 2017), 3–5, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

23　Frederik Møller Henriksen, Jakob Bæk Kristensen, and Eva Mayerhöffer, "Dissemination of RT and Sputnik Content in European Digital Alternative News Environments: Mapping the Influence of Russian State-Backed Media across Platforms, Topics, and Ideology," International Journal of Press/Politics 29, no. 3 (2024): 795–818, https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241230281, 797.

24　Vladislav Saran, "Media Manipulation and Psychological War in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova," CES Working Papers 8, no. 4 (2016): 738–752, accessed June 13, 2025, Econstor, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198490/1/ceswp-v08-i4-p738-752.pdf, 739.

25　Kate Sullivan, "Russia Aims to Undermine Confidence in Pfizer Vaccine, US Officials Say," CNN, March 7, 2021, 1, https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/07/politics/russian-disinformation-pfizer-vaccines/index.html.

26　Bergmann et al., Russia's Shadow War Against the West, 6.

27　S.Z. Zhiznin and V.M. Timokhov, "The Economic Aspects of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline," Baltic Region, no. 4 (2018): 39-41, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335816166_Economic_and_geopolitical_aspects_of_the_Nord_Stream_2_gas_pipeline.

28　Zhiznin and Timokhov, "The Economic Aspects of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline," 38.

29　Askar Nailevich Mustafin and Svetlana Nikolaevna Kotenkova, "Impact of Import Substitution Policy on Economic Growth," Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 2022, 324, https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/10/12/324.

30　Andrew Monaghan and Andrei Jankovski, "Energy Security in Europe: The Role of the Southern Gas Corridor," Ufuk University Journal of Social Sciences (2016): 62-65, https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/1359122.

31　Remnick, "Watching Eclipse," 24.

32　Stephen F. Cohen, Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War. (Columbia University Press, 2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe14896.

33　Simon Tisdall, "Feeding off Anger, Fuelled by Russia… Enter Călin Georgescu, Europe's Latest Radical Populist," The Guardian, November 30, 2024, 1, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/nov/30/calin-georgescu-romania-europe-radical-populist-putin-propaganda.

34　Michael McFaul, "Russia's Ideology of Queerphobia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2024, 4, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/09/russia-ideology-queerphobia?lang=en.

35　Gleb Stolyarov, "Russia Cracks Down on Anti-Vaxxer Disinformation as Inoculation Push Lags Behind," Reuters, November 24, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-cracks-down-anti-vaxxer-disinformation-inoculation-push-lags-behind-2021-11-24/.

36　Martin Lane, "Leaked Files from Putin's Troll Factory: How Russia Manipulated European Elections," VSquare, December 2024, 1, https://vsquare.org/leaked-files-putin-troll-factory-russia-european-elections-factory-of-fakes/.

REFERENCES

Books:

Adamsky, Dmitry. *Russian Hybrid Warfare: Resurgence and Politicization.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2021. https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=31821

Blanton, Shannon L., and Charles W. Kegley. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation.* 18th ed. Boston: Cengage Learning, 2024. eText ISBN 9798214153490. Chapters 7, "The Threat of Armed Conflict to the World," 8, "The Pursuit of Power through Arms and Alliances," and 9, "The Quest for Peace Through International Law and Collective Security."

Cohen, Stephen F. *Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War.* Columbia University Press, 2009. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/cohe14896.

Snyder, Timothy. *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America.* Tim Duggan Books, 2018. https://crs.swanlibraries.net/Record/a2098791?searchId=87550301&recordIndex.

Stent, Angela E. *The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century.* Princeton University Press, 2014. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt4cgb8m.

Journal Articles:

Baranec, Tomáš. "Georgian Wine Exports and Russia's Economic Leverage." *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,* November 8, 2016. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13408-georgian-wine-exports-and-russia%E2%80%99s-economic-leverage.html.

Bergmann, Max, Maria Snegovaya, Gabrielle Gurley, and Ivy Schamis. *Russia's Shadow War Against the West.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-shadow-war-against-west.

Bourne, Piers. "KGB Active Measures and the Disinformation Campaign Against AIDS." *International Politics Studies* 18, no. 3 (2021). https://academic.oup.com/ips/article/18/3/olae024/7708152.

Burkholder, Jon. "Understanding Hybrid Warfare: The Russian Playbook." *Journal of Advanced Military Studies* 14, no. 2, Fall 2023. https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/JAMS_Fall%202023_14_2_Burkholder.pdf.

Galeotti, Mark. "Active Measures: Russia's Covert Geopolitical Operations." *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies,* no. 31, 2019. https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/security-insights/active-measures-russias-covert-geopolitical-operations-0.

Galeotti, Mark. "Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages Its Political War in Europe." *European Council on Foreign Relations,* 2017. JSTOR. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.neu.edu/stable/resrep21563.

Galeotti, Mark. *The Weaponization of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022. https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300268174/the-weaponization-of-everything/.

Henriksen, Frederik Møller, Jakob Bæk Kristensen, and Eva Mayerhöffer. "Dissemination of RT and Sputnik Content in European Digital Alternative News Environments: Mapping the Influence of Russian State-Backed Media across Platforms, Topics, and Ideology." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 29, no. 3 (2024): 795–818. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241230281.

Iskandarov, Khayal. "Economic Coercion as a Means of Hybrid Warfare: The South Caucasus as a Focal Point." *Security and Defence Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (2024). https://securityanddefence.pl/pdf-151038-85044.pdf.

Mustafin, Askar Nailevich, and Svetlana Nikolaevna Kotenkova. "Impact of Import Substitution Policy on Economic Growth." *Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute* 10, no. 12 (2022). https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7099/10/12/324.

Mueller, Grace B., and Brandon Valeriano. *Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War: From Strange Patterns to Alternative Futures.* Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 18, 2023.

Reynolds, David. "Chapter 14: Russian Active Measures." In *Russian Hybrid Warfare: A Study of Russian Military Doctrine,* edited by Michael J. Kofman, 220-239. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2021. https://www.marshallcenter.org/sites/default/files/files/2021-06/RGR%20Chapter%2014.

Saran, Vladislav. "Media Manipulation and Psychological War in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova." *CES Working Papers* 8, no. 4 (2016): 738–752. Accessed June 13, 2025. Econstor. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/198490/1/ceswp-v08-i4-p738-752.

Zhiznin, S.Z., and V.M. Timokhov. "The Economic Aspects of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline." *Baltic Region,* no. 4 (2018). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335816166_Economic_and_geopolitical_aspects_of_the_Nord_Stream_2_gas_pipeline.

Reports:

Heathershaw, John, and Scott Edwards. *The Illicit Financialisation of Russian Foreign Policy.* Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 2023. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/publications/illicit-financialisation-of-russian-foreign-policy-report.pdf.

Libicki, Martin C. *Russia's Hybrid Warfare: The Case of Ukraine.* RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf.

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. *Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution.* Intelligence Community Assessment 2017-01D. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 6, 2017. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.

Paul, Christopher, and Miriam Matthews. *Russia's Use of Media and Information Operations in the Ukraine Crisis.* RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.

Websites and Newspaper Articles:

Allyn, Bobby. "Deepfake Video of Zelenskyy Could Be 'Tip of the Iceberg' in Info War, Experts Warn." *National Public Radio,* March 16, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/03/16/1087062648/deepfake-video-zelenskyy-experts-war-manipulation-ukraine-russia.

Bender, Ashley L., and Lily Hughes. "What to Know About Notorious Mercenary Organization 'The Wagner Group' and Its Founder." *Time,* April 1, 2023. Accessed June 14, 2025. Ebsco (via TIME.com). https://time.com/6251579/wagner-group-yevgeny-prigozhin/.

Bird, Danny. "How the 'Red Terror' Exposed the True Turmoil of Soviet Russia 100 Years Ago." *Time,* September 5, 2018. https://time.com/5386789/red-terror-soviet-history/."Disinformation on Telegram: How Russian Propaganda Works in Temporarily Occupied Territories." *EU Neighbours East.* Accessed June 14, 2025. https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/stories/disinformation-on-telegram-how-russian-propaganda-works-in-temporarily-occupied-territories/.

Galeotti, Mark. "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War." *In Moscow's Shadows* (blog), July 6, 2014. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/.

Georgacopoulos, Christina, and Grayce Mores. *How Fake News Affected the 2016 Presidential Election.* Baton Rouge, LA: LSU Fight Fake News, July 2020.

Giles, Keir. *Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare.* Reviewed by Robert L. Hutchings. *Air University Press,* August 24, 2023. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/AUPress/Book-Reviews/Display/Article/3143126/active-measures-the-secret-history-of-disinformation-and-political-warfare/.

Gallagher, Sean. "DNC Email Leak the Work of a Russian Hack, Says Cybersecurity Firm." *The Guardian,* July 26, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/26/dnc-email-leak-russian-hack-guccifer-2.

Holroyd, Matthew, and Fola Olorunselu. "Deepfake Zelenskyy Surrender Video Is the 'First Intentionally Used' in Ukraine War." *Euronews,* March 16, 2022. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/16/deepfake-zelenskyy-surrender-video-is-the-first-intentionally-used-in-ukraine-war.

Johnson, Emily D. "Media as Memory Makers: An Analysis of How Kremlin-Funded Media Outlets Weaponize Nostalgia and Impact Collective Memory." *Eurasiatique,* April 4, 2022. https://eurasiatique.ca/2022/04/04/media-as-memory-makers-an-analysis-of-how-kremlin-funded-media-outlets-weaponize-nostalgia-and-impact-collective-memory.

McFaul, Michael. "Russia's Ideology of Queerphobia." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,* September 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/09/russia-ideology-queerphobia?lang=en.

Stolyarov, Gleb. "Russia Cracks Down on Anti-Vaxxer Disinformation as Inoculation Push Lags Behind." *Reuters,* November 24, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-cracks-down-anti-vaxxer-disinformation-inoculation-push-lags-behind-2021-11-24/.

Tisdall, Simon. "Feeding off Anger, Fuelled by Russia… Enter Călin Georgescu, Europe's Latest Radical Populist." *The Guardian,* November 30, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/nov/30/calin-georgescu-romania-europe-radical-populist-putin-propaganda.